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ABSTRACT 
 
The general theme of this dissertation is agricultural risk and insurance in the United 
States. Chapter 2 examines welfare effects of the 2002 farm bill programs and yield 
insurance as well as their impacts on acreage decision of a representative Iowa farmer. 
Instead of measuring welfare using expected utility to capture farmers’ preferences over risky 
alternatives, we apply recent advances in decision theory and use prospect theory to measure 
welfare changes due to government programs. The results indicate that there is no policy 
distortion to farmers’ acreage decisions and farmers’ willingness to pay per dollar of program 
cost is greatest for crop insurance. Given that farmers have crop insurance, the willingness to 
pay per dollar of program cost is much lower for loan deficiency payments, direct payments, 
and counter-cyclical payments. Chapter 3 develops a method for determining the aggregate 
risk of a book of business using hail insurance data. A spatial statistical approach is 
employed to measure the spatial correlation of hail loss cost. Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques are employed to simulate hail losses for a wide range of books of business. A 
regression model is estimated that captures the essence of the Monte Carlo simulation.  This 
model can then be used to quickly estimate the degree of poolability of any given book of 
business. Chapter 4 turns to weather-based index contracts as alternative risk-management 
instruments in agriculture. A major concern associated with index contracts is basis risk. To 
address spatial basis risk, two spatial interpolation approaches, a geo-statistical approach and 
a Markov random field approach, are compared. The Markov random field approach is 
preferred because it has a smaller cross-validation prediction mean squared error. A 
temperature index insurance is presented based on interpolated data. The potential 
 
vi 
 
performance of the proposed index insurance is investigated through historical analysis in 
contract years 1980 to 2005. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 There is a widespread belief that the risk of crop losses cannot be effectively pooled by 
private insurance companies because of the systemic nature of risks inherent in crop 
insurance and because of asymmetric information problems, particularly adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems. Systemic risk in agriculture stems primarily from the impact of 
geographically extensive unfavorable weather events, such as droughts, floods or extreme 
temperatures, which induce significant correlation among individual yield losses, thereby 
defeating insurer efforts to pool risks across farms. Moral hazard occurs when the insured 
changes his behavior after purchasing the insurance so that the probability of receiving an 
indemnity increases. Adverse selection occurs when farmers have more information about 
the risk of loss than the insurer does. Adverse selection describes the situation where farmers 
who realize that their expected indemnity will exceed premium are more likely to buy 
insurance than those who don’t. Moral hazard and adverse selection induce high transaction 
costs to insurers who ultimately must pass these expenses onto insurance purchasers by 
loading premium rates.  
Despite the problems mentioned above, government supports crop insurance because it 
provides ex ante risk protection, rather than ex post forms of disaster assistance. However, as 
a mechanism for providing subsidies, government premium subsidies are often inefficient 
and associated with high social cost. The first topic of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 
2, is about the welfare effects of 2002 farm bill programs and yield crop insurance as well as 
their impacts on acreage decision of a representative Iowa farmer who receives both farm 
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program benefits and crop insurance benefits. The 2002 farm bill contains three basic income 
support payments: counter-cyclical payments, loan deficiency payments, and direct 
payments.  In addition, most acreage planted to crops supported by the farm bill programs 
also is insured under the U.S. crop insurance program. Therefore, there are a total of four 
government programs available for farmers to use against risks in agricultural production. 
The question addressed is whether U.S. farm programs provide too much protection, where 
“too much” is defined as low marginal willingness to pay by farmers for each unit of 
expected protection. Instead of measuring welfare using expected utility to capture farmers’ 
preferences over risky alternatives, we apply recent advances in decision theory and use 
prospect theory to measure welfare changes due to government programs. The representative 
farmer allocates acreage to corn, soybeans and alfalfa hay which are the three most widely 
grown crops in Iowa. Monte Carlo simulation technique is employed based on closed-form 
probability density functions of crop yields and futures prices. The farmer’s acreage decision 
is made by maximizing farmers’ expected profit, expected utility and expected value from 
prospect theory via a grid search method. Certainty equivalent returns (CER) are used to 
measure benefits of the programs. By comparing DPs only, CCPs only, LDPs only, or 
insurance only with no program at all, we get the willingness to pay for these programs 
respectively. By comparing all programs with removing insurance only, LDPs only, CCPs 
only, or DPs only, we get the willingness to accept measure for these programs respectively. 
Changes in optimal acreage, CER and expected profit allow calculation of the welfare 
changes and program efficiency. 
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The systemic nature of crop losses defeats insurers’ effort to pool risks across space. 
The existence of private hail insurance market indicates that hail-caused yield loss risk can be 
made poolable. The essential difference between crop insurance and hail insurance lies in the 
level of risk dependence across space. The higher the level of risk dependence across space, 
the lower the risk poolability. Given a book of business, a question that insurers are 
extremely interested in is how large is systemic risk and what is the degree of poolability? To 
measure the degree of poolability of a book of business, people can apply stochastic 
simulation models of insurance indemnities to compute the variability of total indemnities 
paid. However, this procedure is complicated and time-consuming. In addition, the procedure 
needs to be repeated in order to evaluate risk poolability for each book of business. The 
objective of the second topic of this dissertation, Chapter 3, is to develop a method to 
measure risk poolability of any specific book of business quickly by simply knowing a few 
key statistics of the given book of business. The method is developed using hail insurance 
data. The development proceeds as follows. First, a spatial variogram is estimated and a 
theoretical model of loss cost resulting from hail damage in Iowa is fit to the empirical data.  
Thus, we explicitly model hail loss using a spatial statistical approach. Next, hail losses are 
simulated for a wide range of books of business using Monte Carlo simulation. And finally, a 
regression model is estimated that captures the essence of the Monte Carlo simulation.  This 
model can then be used to quickly estimate the degree of poolability of any given book of 
business. 
 Concerns over the systemic nature of crop losses and costs of insuring farm-level 
crop yield have prompted increased interest in weather-based index contracts as alternative 
risk-management instrument in agricultural production. The underlying weather index is 
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usually a weather variable or a function of multiple weather variables accumulated over a 
period of time. There are many advantages of weather index contracts over the traditional 
individual-yield and area-yield crop insurance. First, individual who use an index contract 
should be unable to influence the outcome that determines payment from the contract. 
Monitoring needs are reduced, which lowers transaction costs. Second, the indemnity 
structure is not directly tied to actual crop yield. This saves lost adjustment costs and 
eliminates the possibility of moral hazard. Adverse selection is minimized or eliminated 
because premium calculation is based on objective weather events which are independent of 
participation of producers in the program. Last, aggregating production risks across space 
may reduce the idiosyncratic risk in the aggregate portfolio, the insurer can then hedge the 
systemic weather risk using weather derivatives via the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and 
over-the-counter security markets. 
The major concern associated with index contract is basis risk. There are two layers 
of weather basis risk. The first layer, or the spatial basis risk, refers to the fact the weather 
index value defined at a weather station may not be the same as the realized weather index 
value at a specified location. The second layer, or the technological basis risk, refers to the 
fact that the underlying weather index is an imperfect hedge against risk exposure even if the 
underlying index and exposure being hedged correspond to the same location. As a result, 
producer may not receive an indemnity even if he/she suffers a production loss, or 
alternatively, may receive an indemnity even though no loss has occurred. Basis risk has 
been cited as a primary concern for the implementation of weather hedges in many studies. 
However, most of these studies put emphasis on solving the second layer of basis risk, 
leaving spatial basis risk as still an open question. As Richards et al. (2004) mentioned, 
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economic research can do little to remedy the spatial basis risk problem. There are two main 
approaches to address spatial dependence problems. One is the standard, well-developed geo-
statistical approach. The other is the less-developed Markov random field (MRF) approach. 
Both the geo-statistical approach and the MRF approach have strengths and weaknesses in 
terms of operational and data-analytic aspects. The third topic of this dissertation, presented 
in Chapter 4, focuses on the spatial basis risk in the implementation of weather-based index 
contract. A temperature index insurance contract is designed to provide protection to corn 
growers in Iowa. The contract is essentially an exotic call option on the temperature index, 
cooling degree days, accumulated during the summer season (ACDD). To address the spatial 
basis risk in implementing this temperature index insurance, Both the geo-statistical model 
and the MRF model in addition to a naive multiple linear regression model which assume no 
underlying spatial correlation of ACDD are fitted to the data. MRF approach is preferred in 
the sense of smaller cross-validation prediction mean squared error and the fact that MRF 
approach promises straightforward extension to multiple years of data in model estimation. 
The insurance policy is rated using Monte Carlo simulation assuming that ACDD at a given 
location follows normal distribution. ACDD is interpolated for locations where recorded 
ACDD data is not available through MRF prediction approach. Potential performance of the 
proposed insurance policy is investigated through historical analysis in contract years 1980 to 
2005. 
 
1.2 Organization of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organized into five chapters. The first chapter provides a general 
introduction to the three topics discussed in this dissertation which are presented in chapter 2, 
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chapter 3 and chapter 4, respectively. The three topics are related with regard to the general 
theme of crop risks and insurance. However, the three topics also stand alone with each topic 
addressing a different component of the general theme. Chapter 2 examines the welfare 
effects of 2002 farm bill programs and yield crop insurance as well as their impacts on 
acreage decision of a representative Iowa farmer who receives both farm program benefits 
and crop insurance benefits. Chapter 3 develops a method to measure risk poolability of any 
specific book of business quickly by simply knowing a few key statistics of the given book of 
business of which the insured risks are spatially correlated. Chapter 4 turns to weather-based 
index insurance contracts as alternative risk-management instruments in agricultural 
protection. The study focuses on reducing basis risk which is the major concern in the 
implementation of weather index insurance contracts. Chapter 5 gives a general conclusion to 
the research findings on the three topics discussed in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 2. USING PROSPECT THEORY TO EVALUATE 
STOCHASTIC FARM PROGRAM PAYMENTS 
 
Abstract  
Passage of the 2002 farm bill together with the Agricultural Risk Protection Act passed 
in 2000 brought increased protection for farm income against both adverse price movement 
and crop losses. The farm bill contains three basic income support payments: counter-
cyclical payments, loan deficiency payments, and direct payments.  In addition, most acreage 
planted to crops supported by the farm bill programs also is insured under the U.S. crop 
insurance program. Many observers question the efficiency of these programs because of the 
high level of protection. The question addressed by this research is whether U.S. farm 
programs provide too much protection, where “too much” is defined as low marginal 
willingness to pay by farmers for each unit of expected protection. This paper examines 
farmers’ willingness to pay for these programs as well as their impacts on acreage decisions. 
Instead of measuring welfare using expected utility to capture farmers’ preferences over risky 
alternatives, we apply recent advances in decision theory and use prospect theory to measure 
welfare changes due to government programs. The results indicate that of these four 
programs, farmers’ willingness to pay per dollar of program cost is greatest for crop 
insurance. Given that farmers have crop insurance, the willingness to pay per dollar cost is 
much lower for loan deficiency payments, direct payments, and counter-cyclical payments. 
The efficiency measures of these government programs are low because of three reasons. 
First, the sum of the decision weights is 0.74, which implies that 26% of the expected value 
is eliminated at the very beginning. Second, the payments from any individual government 
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program is small which only move the farmer from the state of loss to another state of loss 
where loss aversion coefficient shrinks the WTP for programs by a factor of 1/2.25. And last, 
the payments from these government programs are made not only when there is a loss but 
also when there is a gain. The change in expected value is lower when many of payments are 
made in the gains part relative to the change in expected value when all the payments are 
made in the loss part. As far as the distortionary impacts of the programs are concerned, we 
find that under either harsh or no yield penalties for planting soybeans after soybeans or corn 
after corn, there is no policy distortion to farmers’ acreage decisions. Therefore, government 
programs act as lump-sum transfers to Iowa farmers with regard to their acreage decisions. 
WTA valuations are higher than WTP valuations of the individual programs suggest that 
there is an endowment effect. It leads to more pain to farmers to be deprived of those 
government programs when farmers originally have access to them than joy to farmers by 
providing farm programs when they are originally not available to farmers. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Passage of the 2002 farm bill along with the Agricultural Risk Protection Act passed in 
2000 brought increased protection of farm income against both adverse price movement and 
crop losses. The farm bill contains three basic income support payments: counter-cyclical 
payments (CCPs), loan deficiency payments (LDPs), and direct payments (DPs).  In addition, 
most acreage planted to crops supported by the farm bill programs are also insured under the 
U.S. crop insurance (CI) program. Thus, there are four government programs that farmers 
can use for income support and risk reduction. 
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DPs are fixed payments to farmers made based on a producer’s historical base 
production. The DP rate is a fixed payment amount per unit of base production. CCPs give 
additional payments to farmers when market prices fall below the effective target price of 
crops. CCP payments are based on historical production levels also. The CCP payment rate is 
not fixed like the DP rate, but depends on the 12-month marketing year average for each 
eligible crop. Because DPs and CCPs depend on base acres and base yields, they are 
decoupled from a farmer’s current production decision. LDPs are made when the posted 
county price is below the loan rate for the county. Farmers can choose which day they take 
their LDPs. This payment is made based on the producer’s current production instead of 
historical production. Therefore, LDPs are coupled. The payment rate is determined by the 
national loan rate and posted county prices on the chosen execution day. While DPs are 
lump-sum payments, CCPs and LDPs provide price insurance. 
The U.S. crop insurance program provides farmers the opportunity to insure against 
unexpected revenue or yield declines. In this analysis, we focus on yield insurance. A 
payment from yield insurance is made to farmers when actual production falls below the 
insured yield. Lost bushels are compensated at the insured price. 
The large amount of support given to U.S. farmers creates both domestic and foreign 
pressures to move U.S. agricultural toward a greater market orientation. Large U.S. budget 
deficits also create reform pressure on government to reduce the magnitudes of domestic 
interventions in agricultural markets. Taking Iowa farmers as an example, this paper provides 
an analysis of the welfare impacts on farmers from these government support programs and 
the impacts of these farm programs on a farmer’s acreage decisions.  
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Much theoretical and empirical work has been done on the effects of crop insurance on 
production. (e.g., Ahsan, Ali and Kurian; Nelson and Loehman; Chambers and Quiggin; Wu; 
Keeton, Skees and Long; Robinsn; Yong et al). Yet, only limited research has been 
conducted investigating the effects of DPs, LDPs and CCPs. One exception is a study by 
Hennessy (1998) which investigates the wealth, coupling and income-insurance effects of 
alterations in US agricultural policies that occurred in the 1996 farm bill. Hennessy examined 
the nitrogen decisions of a representative farmer in Iowa who produces 400 acres of 
continuous corn. He analyzes the welfare effects of farm program using expected utility 
theory with a utility function which accommodates both constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) and decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). His conclusion is that income 
support policies that are assumed to be decoupled are not, in fact, completely decoupled 
because of both wealth and insurance effects.  
Another exception is a study by Hennessy, Babcock and Hayes (1997) which 
investigate the budgetary and producer welfare effects of revenue insurance and the 1990 
farm bill when LDPs are the only farm program. They showed that the 1990 farm program is 
not efficient and producers’ welfare can be enhanced by simply giving decoupled lump-sum 
payments. They also showed that a 75% revenue insurance scheme would result in a very 
large reduction in government outlays and would be more efficient than the 1990 farm 
program. They measure efficiency in terms of farmer benefit per dollar cost of program 
protection. To measure producers’ welfare, expected utility theory framework is applied in 
their study. 
         In this research, our primary goal is to examine the welfare effects of the 2002 farm bill 
programs and yield crop insurance as well as their impacts on the acreage decisions of a 
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representative Iowa farmer who receives both farm program benefits and crop insurance 
benefits. Instead of measuring welfare using expected utility to capture farmers’ preferences 
over risky alternatives, we apply recent advances in decision theory and use prospect theory 
to measure welfare changes due to government programs. The representative farmer allocates 
acreage to corn, soybeans and alfalfa hay. We limit the choice set to these three crops 
because they are the three most widely grown crops in Iowa. We include alfalfa hay in our 
analysis because we want to include a non-program crop that a farmer can move into if they 
find program crops are not profitable. With three crop choices, farmers’ acreage decision 
problem becomes a two-decision-variable problem: how many acres allocated to corn and 
how many acres allocated to soybeans, with whatever is left being allocated to alfalfa hay. 
We assume that a farmer’s income comes completely from crop production and no other 
source. Traditional welfare analyses of farm programs use “Harberger Triangle” measures 
(Johnson, 1965). Such methods are less appropriate given the form of the policy 
interventions that we have today, because the amount of payments depends on the 
realizations of prices and yields. In this research, we do an ex ante stochastic analysis to 
measure the distortion and welfare impacts of U.S. farm policies.  
Monte Carlo simulations of program payments and farm income are performed based 
on closed-form probability density functions of crop yields and futures prices. We assume 
that crop yields follow beta distributions and prices follow lognormal distributions. 
Correlations among yields and prices are derived from historical data. Welfare changes due 
to farm programs are measured by ex ante willingness to pay to obtain farm programs and ex 
ante willingness to accept a loss of farm programs. Calculation of these welfare changes in 
proposed theory requires specification of an appropriate preference function to allow an 
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endowment effect. After a series of calibrations, we find that the value function of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) together with the compound-invariant weighting function of Prelec 
(1998) can give a globally consistent characterization of farmers’ preferences over risky 
alternatives. A set of reasonable parameter is obtained for this study by taking guidance from 
other studies. To model farmers’ price expectations, we follow Hoffman (2005) and apply 
the futures price forecasting model to forecast the season average price (SAP) of U.S. corn 
and soybeans. A straightforward extension of Hoffman’s approach allows price volatilities to 
be obtained for use in the Monte Carlo analysis. Expected posted county prices and selling 
price can be obtained from expected season average prices. 
With calibrated preferences and simulated data, the farmer’s acreage decision for corn 
and soybeans respectively is made by maximizing farmers’ expected profit, expected utility 
and expected value from prospect theory via a grid search method. Certainty equivalent 
returns (CER) are used to measure benefits of the programs. By comparing DPs only, CCPs 
only, LDPs only, or insurance only with no program at all, we get the willingness to pay for 
these programs respectively. By comparing all programs with removing insurance only, 
LDPs only, CCPs only, or DPs only, we get the willingness to accept measure for these 
programs respectively. Changes in optimal acreage, CER and expected profit allow 
calculation of the welfare changes and program efficiency. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
Monte Carlo simulations are performed based on closed-form probability density 
functions of crop yields and futures prices. Although there are no firm guidelines about the 
appropriate functional forms to use to model stochastic yields, the literature does suggest that 
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selected functional forms should be somewhat flexible. Day (1965) showed that crop yields 
are skewed and found the beta distribution to be an appropriate functional form for 
parametric estimation. Babcock and Blackmer (1992), Borges and Thurman (1994), Babcock 
and Hennessy (1996), and Coble et al. (1996) have all used beta distributions in their applied 
work. Here, in this analysis, we assume that crop yields follow beta distributions. The density 
function is of the form: 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
1( )
p q
p q
p q y a b y
p y
p q b a
− −
+ −
Γ + − −= ⋅Γ Γ −     ( )bya ≤≤  
Where p>0, q>0 are shape parameters and a and b are the minimum and maximum possible 
yield respectively. 
We assume that crop futures prices for each contract month follow lognormal 
distributions, for which only estimates of mean and volatility are required to define the 
distribution. We model the acreage decisions of a farmer for crop year 2006. Harvested 
production is sold in the 2006 marketing year. For marketing year 2006, contract months for 
corn futures are September and December of 2006, March, May and July of 2007; contract 
months for soybeans futures are September and November of 2006, January, March, May, 
July and August of 2007. The farmer allocates land to corn, soybeans and alfalfa hay. 
The distributions of crop yields and crop prices are outlined in Table 2.1. There are 
sixteen random variables in total: three yield variables, five corn futures prices, seven 
soybeans futures prices and the alfalfa hay price. The mean yields for corn and soybeans are 
assumed at the 2006 expected yields levels in Story County, Iowa which can be obtained 
from USDA-RMA. The standard deviations of corn and soybean yields are calibrated to be 
consistent with a 65% coverage level of crop insurance in Boone County, Iowa. We assume a 
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          Table 2.1. Distribution of crop yields and (futures) prices 
Variable Distribution Mean Standard Deviation Or Volatility 
Corn Yield Beta 169.30 (bu/acre) 50.70 (bu/acre) 
Soybean Yield Beta   45.60 (bu/acre) 13.80 (bu/acre) 
Hay Yield Beta       4.00 (ton/acre)    0.53 (ton/acre) 
Hay Price Lognormal      65.00($/ton)        12.35($/ton) 
Corn Contract Months    
September Lognormal 2.44($/bu) 0.20 
December Lognormal 2.54($/bu) 0.22 
March Lognormal 2.60($/bu) 0.23 
May Lognormal 2.64($/bu) 0.24 
July Lognormal 2.67($/bu) 0.25 
Soybeans Contract Months    
September Lognormal 6.14($/bu) 0.12 
November Lognormal 6.21($/bu) 0.22 
January Lognormal 6.25($/bu) 0.23 
March Lognormal 6.28($/bu) 0.23 
May Lognormal 6.35($/bu) 0.24 
July Lognormal 6.34($/bu) 0.25 
August Lognormal 6.34($/bu) 0.26 
 
well-managed farm so that the mean yield of alfalfa hay is four tons per acre. The standard 
deviation of yield is derived from historical hay yields from 1981 to 2004 in Boone County, 
Iowa. The mean of the hay price is the expected harvesting price at planting time. The 
standard deviation of the price of hay is derived from the historical price of hay from 1981 to 
2004 in Boone County, Iowa. We use the CBOT futures prices on Jan 27th, 2006 as the mean 
price and calculate the volatility of each contract month futures price so that the option 
premium for the at-the-money put option 
of each contract month is equal to the corresponding CBOT option premium on Jan. 27th, 
2006. 
 In implementing the Monte Carlo procedure, it is important that the method 
incorporate the correlation among those random variables. The correlation matrix is derived 
by analyzing historical data. Historical yields of the three crops and the historical hay price 
data for Boone County, Iowa for years 1990 to 2004 can be obtained from the USDA-NASS. 
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After detrending, we can calculate the percentage deviations of yield of each crop by taking 
the ratio of detrended yields to the corresponding mean yield. To obtain the hay price’s 
percentage differences, we calculate the mean, subtract it from the original price series and 
take the ratio of demeaned prices over the mean price. CBOT daily futures price of each 
contract month and realized daily price of each contract month are also available for years 
1990 to 2004. After calculating the average CBOT futures price and the average realized 
price for each contract month for each of these years, we then take the differences of these 
two average measures for each month to get a series of price differences. Now, we have 
thirteen series of price differences and three series of yield percentage deviations. The sample 
correlation matrix of these data is reported in Table 2.2. 
          After obtaining the correlation matrix, 5000 standard-normal deviates for the  
sixteen random variables are generated. Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix 
was used to impose the desired level of correlation. Then, draws of crop yields, hay prices 
and contract month futures prices for corn and soybeans can be obtained by transforming  
these correlated normal deviates because transformation itself will have little impact on  
the degree of correlation among the random variables. We know that alfalfa hay is a  
no-subsidy crop, so its yield and price draws are used directly in this analysis. Yield  
draws of corn and soybeans are also used directly. However, for corn and soybeans, the  
prices we need in the analysis are the season average price (SAP), the selling price (P),  
and the posted county price (PCP).  We need a method to predict these prices from the  
draws of future prices. A crop’s SAP is a 12-month marketing year weighted average  
price. We take this price as the basic price for our analysis because it is the average price 
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at which farmers sell their crops.  
We now turn to the problem of how to estimate our farmer’s expectation of SAP for 
corn and soybeans. We first draw contract month futures prices from their respective 
distributions as shown in Table 2.1. We can use linear interpolation to obtain predicted 
values for non-contract months’ futures prices. Because the SAP is a 12-month marketing 
year weighted average price, we need to know what the weight is for each month of a 
marketing year. Looking at the historical percentage of sales of crop by month in USDA’s 
annual Agricultural Prices Summary from year 1994 to 2004, we see no obvious shift in the 
sales percentage pattern over this time period. Therefore simple averages of those monthly 
sales percentages across years are taken as the weights. The historical and average percentage 
of sales of corn and soybeans for each month of a marketing year are shown in table 2.3 and 
Table 2.4, respectively. Multiplying the twelve monthly futures prices by the twelve monthly 
weights mentioned above, we can derive the expected SAP of crops for years 1995 to 2004. 
Expected SAP is used to determine expected selling price (P) and expected posted county 
price (PCP).  
To see the bias of our expected SAP using futures prices from the actual SAP, we compare 
the estimated SAP and the actual NASS survey SAP from 1995 to 2004. The actual NASS 
survey SAP can be obtained from annual Agricultural Prices Summary. On average there is 
an upward bias of $0.153 for corn and $0.367 for soybeans, namely, 
                                                    SAPc = E(SAPc) – 0.153 
                                                    SAPs = E(SAPs) – 0.367 
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              Table 2.3. Historical monthly sale percentage of corn in a marketing year 
YEAR SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG 
1994-1995 5.0 11.2 12.2 8.5 16.3 7.9 7.7 5.3 5.8 6.2 6.9 7.0 
1995-1996 8.1 17.1 12.9 8.0 17.4 8.3 8.5 6.2 4.3 3.3 3.4 2.5 
1996-1997 4.0 11.4 13.2 8.0 15.1 9.8 8.0 6.1 4.8 5.6 6.7 7.3 
1997-1998 6.2 14.1 11.3 8.1 14.8 6.7 7.4 5.2 5.3 7.4 6.2 7.3 
1998-1999 7.5 13.9 10.3 7.2 12.7 7.6 9.0 4.8 4.3 5.8 7.4 9.5 
1999-2000 9.5 14.2 8.3 6.9 17.2 6.7 8.0 5.5 4.2 4.3 6.1 9.1 
2000-2001 11.3 15.8 8.6 6.8 15.0 5.3 6.4 4.9 4.6 5.4 8.2 7.7 
2001-2002 7.8 11.0 13.3 6.6 12.5 6.0 6.2 6.0 6.3 7.5 8.8 8.0 
2002-2003 7.1 14.0 13.9 8.2 12.6 6.1 6.7 6.5 6.5 5.3 6.0 7.1 
2003-2004 7.0 15.6 11.6 8.7 16.7 7.2 8.0 5.7 3.3 5.3 5.6 5.3 
Average 7.4 13.8 11.6 7.7 15.0 7.2 7.6 5.6 4.9 5.6 6.5 7.1 
 
          Table 2.4. Historical monthly sale percentage of soybeans in a marketing year 
YEAR SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG 
1994-1995 7.0 20.6 10.0 7.7 12.7 7.9 8.8 5.0 5.5 4.4 6.0 4.4 
1995-1996 8.1 26.9 8.5 7.2 15.2 6.1 6.3 5.8 3.8 3.4 4.7 4.0 
1996-1997 3.9 21.0 10.4 7.2 17.8 8.3 7.9 6.1 4.4 3.9 4.3 4.8 
1997-1998 6.3 22.8 8.9 8.8 12.3 7.2 6.0 6.1 5.2 6.3 5.6 4.5 
1998-1999 9.0 22.6 8.4 6.1 10.2 6.3 8.2 4.9 4.4 5.9 6.4 7.6 
1999-2000 10.0 23.9 6.1 6.2 15.3 6.0 7.4 4.8 4.0 3.7 5.9 6.7 
2000-2001 8.7 23.1 8.2 7.1 14.0 6.6 6.4 5.1 6.5 5.3 5.3 3.7 
2001-2002 4.5 21.9 10.9 8.3 16.0 6.6 9.1 5.4 4.2 4.1 5.0 4.0 
2002-2003 5.8 21.2 10.3 9.3 14.4 8.3 6.6 7.5 4.7 3.8 4.6 3.6 
2003-2004 8.8 29.5 9.4 7.9 16.9 6.6 6.1 3.5 2.4 2.2 3.4 3.2 
Average 7.2 23.4 9.1 7.6 14.5 7.0 7.3 5.4 4.5 4.3 5.1 4.7 
 
For corn and soybeans, PCP and P are functions of SAP. According to Babcock and 
Hart (2005), the wedge between SAP and PCP in Boone County, Iowa is $0.26 for corn and 
$0.56 for soybeans. Thus, we have, 
PCPc = SAPc – 0.26 
PCPs = SAPs – 0.56 
          Data covering the last five years of price basis for Boone County is available on the 
CARD website. The weighted average crop basis from CBOT prices is computed as $0.314 
for corn and $0.276 for soybeans in Boone County, Iowa. Here, we use the same weights as 
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those in estimating SAP. The selling price of the crop is equal to CBOT prices minus the 
weighted average Boone crop basis: 
Pc = CBOTc – 0.314 = SAPc + 0.153 – 0.314 = SAPc – 0.161 
Ps = CBOTs – 0.276 = SAPs + 0.367 – 0.276 = SAPs + 0.091 
One thing needs to be noted is that there is a rotation effect in planting crops because of 
soil erosion, lack of pest control and nitrogen changes in availability. According to Hennessy 
(1998) and ISU (2002), if corn is followed by another year of corn, corn yields will on 
average decrease by 10% in Iowa. If soybeans are followed by another year of soybeans, 
soybeans yields will on average decrease by 12.5%.  
The mathematical problem is to choose acres for corn, soybeans and alfalfa hay to 
maximize expected profit and expected utility of the farmer. The total profit from three crops 
is: 
3,2,1,))((
3
1
=+−=Π ∑
=
igpcypA
i
iiiii   
i =1, 2 and 3 denotes corn, soybeans and alfalfa hay, respectively; ip  is the price of crop i ; 
iy  is the yield of crop i ; ic  is the variable cost of crop i . Thus )( iiii cypA −  is the net profit 
from crop i , where 1A  is the percentage of land planted to corn, 2A is the percentage of land 
planted to soybeans and 3A  is the percentage of land planted to hay which is equal 
to 211 AA −− . igp is the income of crop i  coming from government programs, which is the 
sum of the income from DP , CCP , LDP  and crop insurance (CI ) program respectively. 
Each of these programs is defined as follows: 
iDP = ( DP rate i) ×  ( DP  base acre i ) ×  ( DP  base yield i ) ×  0.85; 
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Direct payment of crop i  is a fixed payment based on 85% of a farmer’s historical 
production base of crop i . DP rate i is a fixed payment amount per unit of base production 
( DP base acre × DP base yield) for crop i .  
iCCP  = max ( CCP  rate i , 0) ×  (CCP  base acre i ) ×  (CCP  base yield i ) ×  0.85; 
 whereCCP  rate i  = (target price i  – DP  rate i ) – max(national loan rate i , SAP i ). 
CCP payments provide additional payments to producers when market prices fall below the 
trigger price. The payments are made based on historical production level. But, the 
CCP payment rate per yield unit of crop is not fixed, which depends on the target price, the 
direct payment rate, the national loan rate and the 12-month marketing year average price of 
crop i . 
iLDP  = max ( LDP rate i , 0) ×  (A i ) ×  (actual yield i ); 
where LDP  rate i = county loan rate i – posted county price. LDP payments are made when 
the posted county price is lower than the loan rate. LDP payments are based on the actual 
production level rather than base production as withCCP  and DP . Thus LDP  is referred to a 
coupled payment, where CCP  and DP  are decoupled payments. 
iCI  = max (y
ins
i – y i , 0) ×  p insi  – premium; 
where premium = E (max (y insi – y i , 0) ×  p insi ) ×  ( 1 – subsidy rate ).  
We assume that this farmer purchases yield insurance, which is provided by the APH 
(Actual Production History) crop insurance product. Insurance payments are made whenever 
actual yield falls below the insured yield level. The premium used here is set at actuarially 
fair levels. Subsidy rate is the portion of the premium that the government pays. 
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First Monte Carlo integration is used to obtain expected profit and expected utility of 
farmers. These solutions provide a base case from which to evaluate the effects of moving to 
Prospect Theory. Given Monte Carlo draws of prices and yields for corn, soybeans and hay, a 
grid search method is used to find the optimal acreage level that maximize the expected 
profit and the expected utility. We are primarily interested in the impacts of government 
programs on farmers’ acreage decisions, so we assume farmers’ input decisions like 
machinery or fertilizer usage are made independently of government programs at technology-
efficient levels.  
We begin by finding the optimal acreage using the expected utility theory framework 
by choosing acres for corn and soybeans in the baseline model (without government 
programs). Farmers’ willingness to pay for government programs are represented by the 
change in certainty equivalent returns (CER) which can be easily calculated according to the 
specification of CARA utility. The risk premium ratio is simply the ratio of difference 
between expected profit and CER to the standard deviation of profit. The results are 
presented in Table 2.5.  
We see from the table that as the risk aversion coefficient γ  increases, the risk 
premium ratio increases, but that acreage allocation remains fixed at 50-50 rotation until the 
risk premium ratio moves above 41.54%, which is likely larger than that of the vast majority 
of commercial corn and soybean farmers. Thus we can conclude that for farmers with 
reasonable risk aversion level, alfalfa hay will not enter into solution of acreage  
decision problems. This is not surprising because both corn and soybean have higher 
expected crop profit than does hay. Furthermore, hay does not receive subsidies like corn and 
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      Table 2.5. Optimal acreage allocations with a CARA utility function 
Risk-aversion coefficient γ =0.0001 γ =0.001 γ =0.005 γ =0.007 γ =0.008 γ =0.009 
Profit maximizing corn and 
soybeans acreage shares  
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
Utility maximizing corn and 
soybeans acreage shares 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.5, 0.5) 
 
(0.42, 0.5) 
Expected profit under 
expected profit maximization  
 
195.79 
 
195.79 
 
195.79 
 
195.79 
 
195.79 
 
195.79 
Standard Deviation of profit 102.55 102.55 102.55 102.55 102.55 102.55 
Expected utility under 
expected utility maximization 
 
-0.98 
 
-0.83 
 
-0.43 
 
-0.32 
 
-0.28 
 
-0.25 
Certainty Equivalent Returns 194.89 190.56 170.95 161.66 157.21 153.19 
Ratio of risk premium and 
standard deviation of profit 
 
0.88% 
 
5.10% 
 
24.22% 
 
33.27% 
 
37.61% 
 
41.54% 
 
soybeans, hence the attractiveness of corn and soybeans will only increase once farm 
programs are taken into account.  
 
2.3 Farmers’ preferences over risk and uncertainty 
In order to measure the welfare impacts of those government programs on farmers, we 
need to know farmers’ preferences over risk and uncertainty first. Possible choices arerisk-
neutral preferences, expected utility theory and prospect theory. 
 
2.3.1 Risk-neutral preferences 
Given risk-neutral preferences, maximizing farmers’ expected utility is equivalent to 
maximizing their expected profit. The advantage of choosing risk-neutral preference is that it 
is simple and easy to implement and we don’t need to arbitrarily impose a curvature on 
farmers’ preference. But there is ample evidence from empirical experiments examining 
choices over lotteries that people are not risk-neutral. For example, Selten, Reinhard, 
Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Klaus Abbink (1995) found significant deviations from risk neutral 
behavior with binary lottery payoffs. 
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2.3.1 Expected utility theory 
Expected utility theory has dominated the main normative and descriptive literature in 
decision making under risk. This is also true in the analysis of input and production decision-
making in agriculture. (e.g., Hennessy (1998); Chavas and Holt (1990) and (1996); 
Ramaswami (1992); Collender and Zilberman (1985); Feder and Gershon (1980); Babcock 
and Hayes (2001)). 
Within the expected utility theory framework, the only explanation for risk aversion is 
that the utility function for wealth is concave. People have lower marginal utility for 
additional wealth when he is wealthy than he is poor. Rabin (2000) provides a theorem 
showing that expected-utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk 
aversion over small and modest stakes. Within expected utility theory framework, for any 
concave utility function, even very little risk aversion over small and modest stakes implies 
an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes. Neilson and Winter (2001) investigate 
whether a single constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function can fit data for both 
small- and large-scale risks in both wage-fatality risk tradeoff data and portfolio choice data. 
They show that the coefficients of constant relative risk aversion compatible with wage-
fatality risk premium data are smaller than the coefficients compatible with portfolio choice 
data, suggesting that a utility function used to evaluate large-stakes risks are less risk averse 
than those used to evaluate small- or moderate-stakes risks. This study lends further support 
to the contention that an expected utility preference representation with a single utility 
function is unable to describe choices over both small- or moderate-stakes risks and large-
stakes risks.  
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Indeed, what is empirically the most firmly established feature of risk preferences, loss 
aversion, is a departure from expected-utility theory that provides a direct explanation for 
small and modest-scale risk aversion. Loss aversion says that people are significantly more 
averse to losses relative to the status quo than they are attracted by gains, and more generally 
that people’s utilities are determined by changes in wealth rather than absolute levels (Rabin, 
2000).  
 
2.3.3 Prospect theory 
Over the past 30 years, the expected utility theory framework has come under attack on 
a number of different fronts. First, Kahneman and Tversky (1992) argue that people’s 
utilities are determined by changes in wealth rather than absolute levels. The traditional 
carrier-of-value in the utility function, the individual’s final wealth position, is not 
appropriate. Second, Kahneman and Tversky (1992) demonstrated using simple lotteries that 
utility functions are not globally concave. Rather, preference functions are concave over 
gains and convex (risk seeking) over losses. Third, people are significantly more averse to 
losses relative to the status quo than they are attracted by gains. That is, decision makers are 
loss averse. Lastly, empirical studies indicate that decision makers do not generally treat 
probabilities linearly. Instead, people tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight 
large probabilities. These findings lead to a new form of utility theory --- prospect theory. 
Prospect theory was proposed first by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (KT hereafter). 
One of the most widely used components of prospect theory is the value function which has 
three main characteristics: 
i. It is defined on deviations in wealth from a reference income level; 
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ii. It is generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses; and 
iii. It is steeper for losses than for gains; 
The value function proposed by KT takes the form as represented in (2.1). 
( ) ( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ −−= a
a
x
x
xv λ       for 0
0
<
≥
x
x
                                        (2.1) 
For a <1, the decision maker with this value function is risk averse over gains and risk 
seeking over losses. Furthermore, individuals are more sensitive to losses than gains if the 
loss-aversion coefficient,λ , is greater than one (see Figure 2.1 for the value function in 
prospect theory). This function has found to be empirically robust, analytically convenient 
and the most common value function adopted in prospect theory analysis. A treatment of 
reference–dependent choice raises the question: what is the reference income? Although the 
reference state can be influenced by many factors like 
aspirations, expectations, norm and social comparisons, it is usually determined according to 
what defines gains and losses to decision makers. The decision makers in our crop-
production setting are farmers who are either land owners or land renters. For both land 
owner and land renter, the cost of production is the land rent plus variable cost. The land rent 
would be the equilibrium price of land in a competitive land market which is approximately 
the expected annual returns to land. Farmers who rent land regard a revenue outcome as a 
gain if it is high enough to cover the rent and variable cost or as a loss if otherwise. 
Equivalently, farmers who own their land regard a profit outcome (returns over variable 
costs) as a gain if it is higher than the rent or as a loss if otherwise. 
Another important element of prospect theory is the probability weighting function,π , 
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v(x) 
 
 
Figure 2.1. A hypothetical prospect theory value function 
Source: Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: 
an Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47(2): 279. 
 
which transforms state probabilities into decision weights and is of the following form in KT 
(1979): 
( )
( )( ) 11
pp
p p
γ
γγ γ
π =
+ −
                                              (2.2) 
        The weighting function (2.2) is an increasing function of state probability p , with 
( ) 00 =π  and ( ) 11 =π . That is, outcomes contingent on an impossible event are ignored. But 
this weighting scheme is just a monotonic transformation of outcome probabilities, which has 
two problems. First, sometimes it does not satisfy stochastic dominance, an assumption that 
many are reluctant to give up. Second, it is not readily extended to prospects with a large 
number of outcomes (KT 1992). Both problems can be easily solved by using the rank-
dependent or cumulative functional form. Instead of transforming outcome probability 
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directly, KT (1992) transforms cumulative probabilities separately to gains and losses using 
weighting function (2.3). 
( ) ( )( ) γγγ
γ
/1
1 pp
ppw
++
=+ ,       ( ) ( )( ) δδδ
δ
/1
1 pp
ppw
++
=−              (2.3) 
Prelec (1998) proposes an alternative specification---the compound-invariant weighting 
function as represented by (2.4). While p denotes the state probability associated with a 
monetary outcome in (2.2), we use the same symbol p to denote the cumulative probability 
associated with a monetary outcome in (2.3) and (2.4). 
( ) ))ln(exp( αβ ppw −−= ++ ,      ( ) ))ln(exp( αβ ppw −−= −−             (2.4) 
In (2.4), α represents probability sensitivity that accounts for the shape or the curvature of 
the weighting function. +β and −β represent probability attractiveness that acts to shift the 
entire weighting function up and down relative to the expected utility argument. The shape of 
this two-parameter-form weighting function is nearly identical to that of KT’s. But the 
axiomatic functional form of Prelec’s has a theoretical advantage, that is, they order different 
classes of expected utility violations in the same way. Luce (2001) provides a simpler 
derivation of this weighting function based on reduction invariance, which turned out to be 
equivalent to the two parameter weighting function that Prelec derived. Al-Nowaihi and 
Dhami (2005) gave an even simpler derivation based on power invariance, which is shown to 
be equivalent to the two parameter weighting functions that Prelec derived also. 
Of all the weighting functions that have been proposed, that of Prelec’s has the 
advantages that it is parsimonius, consistent with much of the empirical evidence, and has an 
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axiomatic foundation. Therefore, Prelec’s two-parameter weighting functional form is chosen 
in this study. 
Now, we have a Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) representation which involves 
three continuously increasing scaling functions: a value function v ( )x  , which gives the value 
of a monetary outcome, and two probability weighting functions ( )pw+  and ( )pw− , which 
transform cumulative probabilities into decision weights for gains and losses respectively. 
 
2.4 Implementation and calibration of cumulative prospect theory 
A prospect is a finite distribution over outcomes: (x, p; y, q; …) assigning probability 
p, q … to outcomes x, y …. The CPT representation of preferences is of the following form 
for a prospect with only two outcomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, 0 (2.5 )
v (x, p; y, q) , 0 (2.5 )
, 0 (2.6)
w p q v x w q v y v x x y a
w p q v x w q v y v x y x b
w p v x w q v y x y
+ +
− −
− +
⎧ + + − < <⎪⎪= + + − < <⎨⎪ + < <⎪⎩
 
Equation (2.5) and (2.6) assume a “rank- and sign-dependent” framing of outcomes. If 
x and y have opposite sign, as in equation 2.6, then the prospect is called a mixed prospect 
and framed as a p-chance of losing value of x and q-chance of gaining value of y. If, 
however, both x and y are gains, or both are losses, as in equation 2.5a or 2.5b , then the 
prospect (x, p; y, q) is called a pure positive prospect (or a pure negative prospect) and 
framed as a p + q chance of gaining (or losing) at least the value of the middle outcome v(x), 
and a q chance of gaining (or losing) an extra v(y) – v(x). In CPT, the argument of the 
weighting function is not the probability of obtaining outcome x but the cumulated 
probability of obtaining an outcome at least as good as x, if x is positive, or at least as bad as 
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x, if x is negative. For the simulations in our model, the implementation of CPT is much 
more complicated because we have 5,000 outcomes.  
We present a generalization of equation 2.5 and 2.6 to show the implementation of 
CPT with many outcomes in Monte Carlo analysis.  First, price and yield data (5,000 draws 
for each variable) are generated for corn and soybeans respectively following the same 
procedures as discussed in the Methodology section that found that alfalfa hay does not enter 
into the solution. The maximum expected profit is the profit level where the farmer plants 
half of his land to corn and the other half to soybeans. Using the maximum expected profit as 
the reference income level, gains and losses can be obtained by subtracting reference income 
from simulated profits. To illustrate more clearly, suppose there are 2300 gains and 2700 
losses. Because the weighting scheme is rank- and sign-dependent, we sort gains and losses 
in ascending order and denote the ordered outcomes as 2700, 2699, , 2, 1, 1, 2, , 2299, 2300... ...L L L L G G G G . 
Recall that the weighting scheme transforms cumulative probabilities instead of state 
probabilities into decision weights. So, in order to know the decision weight for each 
monetary outcome, we need to know the corresponding cumulative probability. According to 
equation 2.5 and equation 2.6, the cumulative probability associated with ( )1 1G L is 2300/5000 
(2700/ 5000) and that with ( )2 2G L is 2299/5000 (2699/ 5000). The cumulative probability 
associated with ( )2300 2700G L is 1/ 5000 (1/ 5000). Given cumulative probabilities, we can 
derive decision weights for those monetary outcomes by plugging the cumulative 
probabilities into ( ) ))ln(exp( αβ ppw −−= ++  and ( ) ( )( )αβ ppw lnexp −−= −−  separately. 
Similarly a value measure for each outcome is obtained by plugging gains or losses into the 
positive or negative part of the value function. With a value measure and a decision weight 
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assigned for each monetary outcome, the expected value of this mixed prospect can be 
obtained according to equation (2.7). Certainty equivalent returns (CER) can be derived 
according to the specification of the value function. If the expected value is greater than zero, 
we apply the positive part specification of the value function to get CER. Otherwise, we 
apply the negative part specification of the value function to get CER.  The risk premium 
ratio is simply the ratio of CER to standard deviation of profit.  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 2700 2699
1 2 1 2300 2299
2700 2699 1...
5000 5000 5000
2300 2299 1... (2.7)
5000 5000 5000
EV w v L w v L v L w v L v L
w v G w v G v G w v G v G
− − −
+ + +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + − + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
After implementing CPT in our model, we now calibrate parameters to demonstrate 
why the CPT framework can capture decision makers’ preferences over risk in a globally 
consistent way. 
In CPT representation, we have a total of five parameters to calibrate. The value 
function has two parameters: the risk attitude parameter a and the loss aversion parameterλ . 
The probability weighting function has three parameters: the probability sensitivity 
parameter, ,α which characterizes people’s probability weighting behavior, and the 
probability attractiveness parameterβ . These last two parameters shift the entire weighting 
function up or down relative to probabilities which are used in expected utility. 
There clearly is an identification problem in trying to calibrate all five parameters when 
there is no structural relationship among them. The approach that we take is to use the 
existing literature as a guide. Wickham (2004) uses empirical experiments to test several 
hypotheses related to the five parameters and suggests: 
 
31 
 
i. Given conventional risk behavior, the majority of subjects will be risk averse 
over gains; parametrically, 0 < a < 1. 
ii. Given conventional probability weighting behavior, the majority of subjects 
will demonstrate over-weighting of low probabilities and under-weighting of 
moderate to high probabilities; parametrically, 0 <α < 1, and α  is 
independent of outcome value. 
iii. It is not appropriate to assume β  is equal to one. 
iv. The measured value of the risk attitude parameter a , and probability 
attractiveness parameter +β  and −β , are not independent of monetary outcome 
values. 
         Because the probability sensitivity parameterα is independent of monetary outcome 
value, it is useful to calibrate this parameter first. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) gave 
subjects many different pairs of choices in an effort to derive certainty equivalent returns for 
gambles. They estimated that the probability sensitiveness parameter α should be 0.61 for 
gains and 0.69 for losses. Camerer and Ho (1994) used data from nine studies and gave an 
estimate of α = 0.56. Wu and Gonzalez’s (1996) estimated α = 0.74. They also fit the data to 
Prelec’s weighting function and report 0.74 as an estimate ofα . Prelec (1998) used his own 
experiment data yielding a value of 0.6 forα . Although the specifications of weighting 
function may be different in these studies, these estimates are for the same thing, the 
probability sensitiveness parameter, which characterizes people’s probability weighting 
behavior. Together with these studies and Wickham’s proposition 2, we use 0.65 as a 
reasonable value forα . 
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         There is relatively little controversy about the loss aversion coefficientλ . We simply 
follow Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which suggests that λ is equal to 2.25. This number 
implies that the decision maker values the pain of a dollar loss 2.25 times as much as the 
value of a dollar gain. 
Selection of values for α  and λ  simplify the choice of the remaining three parameters. 
Wickman’s proposition 3 indicates that ,a +β and −β are not independent of monetary 
outcome values. Therefore, our approach is to select a value for a and then solve for the 
value of +β such that we obtain a desired level (say 25%) for the risk premium ratio to 
capture risk aversion preferences over gains which, as a whole, is regarded as a pure positive 
prospect. Similarly, we select a value for a and calculate a corresponding value for −β  by 
assuming a -25% risk premium ratio for risk-seeking preferences over losses which, as a 
whole, is regarded as a pure negative prospect. The risk premium ratio is simply the 
difference between expected gains (losses) and CER for gains (losses) divided by standard 
deviation of gains (losses), depending on whether expected value is positive or negative. This 
approach will give reasonable results so long as the 25% risk premium ratio is believed to be 
a reasonable characterization of people’s preferences over risk.  
We first calibrate parameters for the farmer with a small stake, say only one acre of 
land. Setting different values for a , a corresponding +β and −β can be calibrated as shown in 
Table 2.6 (for an assumed risk premium ratio of 25%). 
It is readily seen that there are infinitely many sets of parameter values such that a risk 
premium ratio of 25% can be obtained. 
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We now calibrate parameters for a farmer with a large stake, say, 1,000 acres of land. 
Setting different values for a , a corresponding +β and −β can be calibrated as 
shown in Table 2.7. It turns out that the same parameter values are obtained for each given 
a as those previously obtained for one acre of land.  This implies that if we measure the risk 
premium ratio of the farmer with 1,000 acres of land at parameter values 
associated with one acre of land, or vice versa, we will get the 25% risk premium ratio, 
which we believe to be reasonable ex ante.   
Put another way, there are infinitely many sets of parameter values for which a 
reasonable risk premium ratio of 25% can be obtained. No matter which set of parameter 
values we choose, the calibrated value function and probability weighting function is a 
globally consistent representation which can characterize farmers’ preferences over risky 
alternatives. Brandstatter and Kuhberger (BK) (1999) proposed a view of the probability 
 
          Table 2.6. Parameter calibration for farmers with one acre of land 
a  +β  −β  
0.32 0.8960 0.8422 
0.52 1.0473 0.9758 
0.60 1.1062 1.0283 
0.70 1.1788 1.0933 
0.80 1.2504 1.1577 
0.88 1.3071 1.2087 
0.95 1.3563 1.2531 
 
             Table 2.7. Parameter calibration for farmers with 1,000 acres of land 
a  +β  −β  
0.32 0.8960 0.8422 
0.52 1.0473 0.9758 
0.60 1.1062 1.0283 
0.70 1.1788 1.0933 
0.80 1.2504 1.1577 
0.88 1.3071 1.2087 
0.95 1.3563 1.2531 
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weighting function as a composite of cognitive and emotional “biases” or “errors” in 
preferences and arrive at the conclusion that nonlinearities in the weighting function of 
probabilities may be the consequence of an intelligent compromise to cognitive and 
emotional “biases” or “errors”. Our calibration results are consistent with BK’s findings. 
The problem now is which specific set of parameter values we should choose for our 
decision and welfare analysis. It is known that individuals with preferences that follow 
cumulative prospect theory bet on unlikely gains and insure against unlikely losses. Neilson 
and Stowe (2002) point out that in order for individuals to bet on unlikely gains and insure 
against unlikely losses, the risk attitude parameter a must be high. When a is low, the 
convexity of the weighting function cannot overcome the concavity of the utility function. 
The estimates for a obtained by Camerer and Ho (1994) (0.32) and Wu and Gonzales (1996) 
(0.52) are too low. The Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate of 
a = 0.88 allows for some betting on unlikely gains and some insurance against unlikely 
losses. We checked the insurance and bet activity in each above study using the simulated 
data and found similar results. Because there are infinitely many sets of parameter values 
giving the 25% risk premium ratio, and when a = 0.88, our simulated results give similar 
insurance and bet activity as in KT’s study, so a set of parameter values where a = 0.88 is 
just picked as shown in Table 2.8.  
 
2.5 Decision and welfare analysis  
   With cumulative prospect theory and calibrated parameter values at hand, it is 
straightforward to carry out the decision and welfare analysis. We first look at the farmer’s 
                           
 
35 
 
                           Table 2.8. The set of parameter values in CPT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.25 
 
0.88 
 
0.65 
 
1.3071 
 
1.2087 
 
willingness to pay (WTP) for government programs.  We do this by first considering the 
impact on optimal acreage choice and the resulting WTP for each government program in 
turn, assuming that no other program is in place, and then calculating optimal acreage choice 
and WTP assuming that all programs are offered together.  The reference income is the 
expected profit (returns over variable costs) when there is no government program. After 
that, we estimate the decision maker’s willingness to accept (WTA) the loss of government 
programs, first singly and then jointly. The reference income in this case is the expected 
profit when farmers have access to all government programs. Comparing the results in WTP 
scenario and WTA scenario, we 
can obtain estimates of the endowment effects of government programs. 
Using Monte Carlo simulation, acreages for corn (as a percentage of total land) and for 
soybeans are found that maximize farmer’s expected profit and expected value. Thus the 
maximum expected profit, maximum expected value and CER can be obtained. Changes in 
CER and changes in expect profits can be easily derived by subtraction. Changes in CER are 
taken as the measure of program benefits while changes in expected profit are taken as the 
measure of program costs. The efficiency with which government redistributes income can 
be measured by the increase in producer welfare per dollar of government spending. Namely, 
the ratio of the change in CER over the change in expected profits. Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 
λ a +β −βα
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present the results assuming that there are “harsh” yield penalties from planting soybeans 
after soybeans or corn after corn. 
The no program case in the WTP scenario and the all programs case in the WTA 
scenario can be regarded as base cases. Any acreage distortion effects can be analyzed by 
comparing the results in each scenario with the corresponding base case. With a 50% acreage 
allocation for each crop in every case, we find no acreage distortion effects from government 
programs, given a 10% yield penalty for corn planted after corn and a 12.5% yield penalty 
for soybeans planted after soybeans. Therefore, government programs act as lump-sum 
transfers to farmers with regard to their acreage decisions. 
As far as the efficiency of individual programs is concerned, we see in Table 2.9 that farmers 
are willing to pay a maximum of $10.59, $4.93, $6.43, $11.66 and $51.43 for DPs, CCPs, 
LDPs, CI and all programs together respectively, while the cost of providing one unit of 
those programs is $23.68, $9.73, $14.48, $14.71 and $62.61, respectively.  
Therefore, DPs, CCPs, LDPs, CI and all programs together increases producer’s welfare by 
about 0.45, 0.51, 0.44, 0.79 and 0.82 dollars for each dollar of government cost, 
respectively. Similar magnitude of efficiency measures can be obtained for WTA results as 
shown in Table 2.10.  
The endowment effects can be seen from the comparison of results of WTP scenario and 
WTA scenario since the high reference income point of WTA scenario is due to the 
endowment of all farm programs. Comparing changes of CER and efficiency measure of 
Table 2.9 and 2.10, we see that with harsh yield penalties for continuous cropping, producer 
values farm programs more when he has the programs than when he doesn’t.  The WTA  
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   Table 2.9. Willingness to pay results when there is a harsh yield penalty ($/acre) 
Harsh penalty/WTP 
no 
program DPs CCPs LDPs INSURANCE 
All 
programs 
Profit maximizing corn 
acreage share 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Value maximizing corn 
acreage share 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Expect Value (EV) -29.37 -13.92 -22.37 -20.19 -12.26 21.63 
CER -18.53 -7.93 -13.60 -12.10 -6.87 32.90 
Changes in CER  10.59 4.93 6.43 11.66 51.43 
Expect Profit (EP) 195.79 219.47 205.52 210.27 210.50 258.39 
Changes in EP  23.68 9.73 14.48 14.71 62.61 
Efficiency  0.451 0.51 0.44 0.79 0.82 
Reference income 195.79 195.79 195.79 195.79 195.79 195.79 
 
   Table 2.10. Willingness to accept results when there is a harsh yield penalty ($/acre) 
Harsh penalty/WTA 
all 
programs 
no 
insurance no LDPs no CCPs no DPs 
No 
program 
Profit maximizing corn 
acreage share 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Value maximizing corn 
acreage share 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Expect Value (EV) -19.22 -39.56 -30.95 -26.92 -36.74 -74.71 
CER -11.45 -25.99 -19.67 -16.78 -23.90 -53.53 
Changes in CER  -14.55  -8.22  -5.33 -12.45 -42.09 
Expect Profit (EP) 258.39 243.68     243.91 248.66 234.71 195.79 
Changes in EP  -14.71     -14.48   -9.73 -23.68 -62.60 
Efficiency  0.99  0.57    0.55    0.53    0.67 
Reference income 258.39   258.39    258.39   258.39 258.39 258.39 
 
valuation of the individual programs on one acre basis is $1.86, $0.40, $1.79 and $2.89 
higher than WTP valuation for DPs, CCPs, LDPs and CI, respectively. In  
another word, it leads to more pain to farmers to be deprived of those government programs 
when farmers originally have access to them than joy to farmers by providing farm programs 
when they are originally not available to farmers. Considering all programs together, 
farmers’ WTP is greater than WTA because, compared with the original state of no program, 
all programs together move farmers from a state of loss to a state of gain. The value function 
                                                 
1 The efficiency measure is scale-independent. The analysis here is on a one-acre land basis. The same   values 
for the efficiency measure were obtained when a 5,000 acre farm was examined.  
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is flatter in the gains part than that in the losses part, a unit of expected value increase is 
associated with a larger increase in CER (WTP) in gains part. Put in another way, loss 
aversion leads farmers willing to pay much more for this move.  
We considered above the general harsh penalty case. But, a portion of Iowa farmers 
experience a lighter penalty or even no penalty due to different locations or new technology 
available. A welfare and decision analysis for the no penalty case is carried out also. Table  
2.11 and Table 2.12 present the results assuming that there are “no” yield penalties from 
 
     Table 2.11. Willingness to pay results when there is no yield penalty ($/acre) 
No penalty/WTP 
no 
program DPs CCPs LDPs insurance all programs 
Profit maximizing 
corn acreage share 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Value maximizing 
corn acreage share 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Expect Value (EV) -46.75 -27.62 -35.67 -36.14 -21.69 28.68 
CER -31.43 -17.28 -23.11 -23.45 -13.13 45.32 
Changes in CER  14.14 8.32 7.97 18.30 76.75 
Expect Profit (EP) 222.25 245.93 232.09 233.61 236.02 280.91 
Changes in EP  23.68 9.84 11.36 13.78 58.66 
Efficiency  0.60 0.85 0.70 1.33 1.31 
Reference income 222.25 222.25 222.25 222.25 222.25 222.25 
 
   Table 2.12. Willingness to accept results when there is no yield penalty ($/acre) 
No penalty/WTA 
all 
programs 
no 
insurance no LDPs no CCPs no DPs 
no 
program 
Profit maximizing 
corn acreage share 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Value maximizing 
corn acreage share 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Expect Value (EV) -20.84 -54.66 -39.26 -31.63 -41.77 -96.01 
CER -12.55 -37.53 -25.77 -20.16 -27.65 -71.19 
Changes in CER  -24.99 -13.22   -7.61 -15.10 -58.65 
Expect Profit (EP) 280.91 267.14 269.55 271.07 257.23 222.25 
Changes in EP  -13.78 -11.36   -9.84  -23.68 -58.66 
Efficiency      1.81     1.16     0.77      0.64      1.00 
Reference income 280.91 280.91 280.91 280.91    280.91 280.91 
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planting soybeans after soybeans or corn after corn. 
The no program case in the WTP scenario and the all programs case in the WTA 
scenario can be regarded as base cases. Any acreage distortion effects can be analyzed by 
comparing the results in each scenario with the corresponding base case. The acreage 
decisions indicate that when there is no yield penalty, the farmer will choose to plant 100% 
of his land to corn because corn has an expected profit higher than that of soybeans. With a 
100% acreage allocation for corn in every case, we find no acreage 
distortion effects from government programs when there is no-yield penalty for  
continuous cropping. Therefore, government programs act as lump-sum transfers to farmers 
with regard to their acreage decisions. 
As far as efficiency of these programs is concerned, we see in Table 2.11 that farmers 
are willing to pay $14.14, $8.32, $7.97, $18.30 and $76.75 for DPs, CCPs, LDPs, CI and all 
programs as a whole respectively, while the cost of providing one unit of those programs is 
$23.68, $9.84, $11.36, $13.78 and $58.66 respectively. Therefore, DPs, CCPs, LDPs, CI and 
all programs as a whole increases producer’s welfare by about 0.60, 0.85, 0.70, 1.33 and 1.31 
dollars for each dollar of government cost, respectively. Similar magnitude of efficiency 
measures can be obtained for WTA results as shown in Table 2.12.  
The endowment effects can be seen from the comparison of results of WTP scenario 
and WTA scenario since the high reference income point of WTA scenario is due to the 
endowment of all farm programs. Comparing changes of CER and efficiency measure of 
Tables 2.11 and 2.12, we see that with no yield penalty for continuous cropping, producer 
values farm programs more when he has a higher endowment except for CCP program. The 
WTA valuation of the individual programs on one acre basis is $0.96, $5.25 and $6.69 higher 
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than WTP valuation for DPs, LDPs and CI, respectively. In another word, it leads to more 
pain to farmers to be deprived of those government programs when farmers originally have 
access to them than joy to farmers by providing farm programs when they are originally not 
available to farmers. Considering all programs together, farmers’ WTP is greater than WTA 
because, compared with the original state of no program, all programs together move farmers 
from a state of loss to a state of gain. Loss aversion leads farmers willing to pay much more 
for this move.  
One problem that arose with these results is the low willingness to pay for DPs.  Most 
observers would assume that the willingness to pay for DPs should be close to one because 
DPs are a lump-sum payment. But, in our analysis, we found efficiency measures much 
lower than one. After breaking down the efficiency analysis, we find that there are three 
reasons which account for the low efficiency measure for DPs and for all other individual 
programs.  
First, as KT (1992) mentioned, for both pure positive and pure negative prospects, the 
decision weights add to one, For mixed prospects, however, the sum can be either smaller or 
greater than one, because the decision weights for gains and for losses are defined by 
separate functions. In our mixed prospect, the sum of decision weights turns out to be 0.74. 
This implies that when we calculate the expected value of the mixed prospect, we eliminate 
26% of the expected value at the very beginning because the sum of weights equal to 0.74 
instead of one. Farmer’s willingness to pay thus the efficiency measure is lower accordingly. 
The efficiency measure for DPs is 0.62 after increasing all decision weights by a factor of 
1/0.74 so that the sum of weights is equal to one. Second, without any government program, 
the farmer is originally in a state of loss on average because of the skewed yield distribution. 
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The payments from any single individual government program is small which only move the 
farmer from the state of loss to another state of loss where loss aversion is a key factor for 
farmers to evaluate the welfare of government programs. Loss aversion coefficient shrinks 
the WTP for programs by a factor of
1( )
0.881
2.25
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . The efficiency measure is lower 
accordingly given the fixed cost of programs. The third reason for low efficiency is that 
direct payments (and the other program payments as well) are made not only when there is a 
loss but also when there is a gain. Expected value is essentially the weighted average of all 
values. Loss aversion leads to more value associated with a dollar increase in the loss part 
than that in the gains part. In addition, the calibrated weighting scheme where β + is greater 
than β − results in a higher decision weight for a loss than for a gain of the same order. 
Therefore, the change in expected value is lower when many of payments are made in the 
gains part relative to the change in expected value when all the payments are made in the loss 
part. Put in another way, a dollar payment is of higher efficiency when there is a loss than 
when there is a gain. An investigation showed that the proportion of payments made in the 
gains part for DPs, CCPs and LDPs are 43.2%, 23.5% and 24.7%, respectively. For CI, only 
9.7% of the payments are made in the gains part, which account for the highest efficiency of 
CI among those government programs. To verify that it is because of payments made in the 
gains part that leads to the low efficiency measure of these programs, we performed a WTP 
analysis for revenue insurance which is designed to provide protection to farmers against the 
risk of low profit. Payments are triggered when the profit from crops is lower than the 
expected profit. There is no payment made if vice versa. The efficiency of the revenue 
insurance varies from 1.10 to 3.25 at different levels of premium subsidy rate which takes 
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value in the range from 0.1 to 1.0. For this revenue insurance, every dollar payment is made 
in the loss situation. Thus a much higher efficiency measure is obtained. 
 
2.6 Summary of results 
In sum, we find that for our representative Iowa farmer, agronomy dominates. There is 
no policy distortion to farmers’ acreage decisions. Therefore, government programs act as 
lump-sum transfers to farmers with regard to their acreage decisions.  
The efficiency measures of individual government programs are low because of three 
reasons. First, for our mixed prospect, the sum of decision weights turns out to be 0.74. This 
implies that when we calculate the expected value of the mixed prospect, we eliminate 26% 
of the expected value at the very beginning because the sum of weights equal to 0.74 instead 
of one. Farmer’s willingness to pay thus the efficiency measure is lower accordingly. Second, 
the payment from each of the government programs only moves the farmer from a state of 
loss to another state of loss where loss aversion is a key factor for farmers to evaluate the 
welfare of a government programs. Loss aversion coefficient shrinks the WTP for programs 
by a factor of 1/2.25. The efficiency measure is lower accordingly given the fixed cost of 
programs. And third, the payments from these government programs are made not only when 
there is a loss but also when there is a gain. Expected value is essentially the weighted 
average of all values. Loss aversion leads to more value associated with a dollar increase in 
the loss part than that in the gains part. In addition, the calibrated weighting scheme where 
β + is greater than β − results in a higher decision weight for a loss than for a gain of the same 
order. Therefore, the change in expected value is lower when many of payments are made in 
the gains part relative to the change in expected value when all the payments are made in the 
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loss part. Put in another way, a dollar payment is of higher efficiency when made in the loss 
part than in the gains part. Crop insurance has the highest efficiency among these individual 
programs because the proportion of payments made in the gains part are much smaller 
compared with that of DPs, CCPs and LDPs.  
The endowment effects can be seen from the comparison of results of WTP scenario 
and WTA scenario since the high reference income point of WTA scenario is due to the 
endowment of all farm programs. Comparing changes of CER and efficiency measure of 
Table 2.9 and 2.10, Table 2.11 and 2.12, except for CCP program in no-penalty case, farmers 
value government programs more when he has a higher endowment. In another word, it leads 
to more pain to farmers to be deprived of those government programs when farmers 
originally have access to them than joy to farmers by providing farm programs when they are 
originally not available to farmers. Considering all programs together, however, farmers’ 
WTP is greater than WTA because, compared with the original state of no program, all 
programs together move farmers from a state of loss to a state of gain. Loss aversion leads 
farmers willing to pay much more for this move.  
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CHAPTER 3. A METHOD FOR MEASURING POOLABILITY OF 
SPATIALLY CORRELATED RISK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
There is a widespread belief that the risks of crop losses cannot be effectively pooled 
by private insurance companies, which is one justification given for public support of the 
crop insurance industry. Numerous studies have examined this and other possible reasons for 
market failure. Among the first explanations is market failure attributed to asymmetric 
information problems, particularly adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Skees and 
Reed 1986; Chambers 1989; Nelson and Loehman 1987; Goodwin and Smith 1995). Moral 
hazard occurs when the insured changes his behavior after purchasing the insurance so that 
the probability of receiving an indemnity increases. Adverse selection occurs when farmers 
have more information about the risk of loss than the insurer does. Adverse selection 
describes the situation where farmers who realize that their expected indemnity will exceed 
premium are more likely to buy insurance than those who don’t. Harwood et al. (1999) think 
that the reasons, on the demand side, why private crop insurance markets have not developed 
is due to  the high cost of crop insurance relative to other alternative risk management 
strategies to mitigate the risk that they face. These include futures and options markets, 
contracting, crop and livestock diversification, non-farm income, federal price and income 
support programs, and federal disaster assistance payments.  
More recent explanations impute market failure to systemic nature of risk inherent into 
crop insurance (Mirander and Glauber 1997; Duncan and Meyers 2000; Skees and Barnett 
1999; and Mason et al 2003). Systemic risk in agriculture stems primarily from the impact of 
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geographically extensive unfavorable weather events, such as droughts, floods or extreme 
temperatures, which induce significant correlation among individual yield losses. One of the 
necessary conditions for a risk to be poolable is that there are a large number of roughly 
homogeneous, independent exposure units so that the law of large numbers can provide an 
accurate prediction of average future losses. Insurance markets are better suited for sharing 
uncorrelated risks such as automobile accident and property damage due to fire and wind. In 
the classic sense, crop yields are not insurable because losses are correlated which violates 
the independence condition of insurance Skees and Barnett (1999). In their 1997 study, 
Miranda and Glauber define a measure of systemic risk as the ratio of the actual coefficient 
of variation of indemnity paid to the hypothetical one when insured losses were independent. 
A ratio of one indicates no systemic risk. Systemic risk increases as the ratio increases above 
one. They use a stochastic simulation model to generate U.S. corn, soybeans and wheat yield 
draws with existing correlation imposed and compute coefficient of variation of total 
indemnities paid by the 10 largest crop insurers under a 35% deductible crop insurance 
program in the U.S. The systemic risk ratios indicate that U.S. crop insurers face portfolio 
risk anywhere from 22 to 49 times larger than if indemnities were independent. They 
conclude that the high level of systemic risk undermines a crop insurer’s ability to diversify 
risk across space, and prevents it from performing the essential function: the pooling of risk 
across individuals. Motivated by this study, Mason et al. (2003) break down the total risk 
absorbed by the U.S. crop insurance industry into poolable and systemic components. 
Various hedging strategies using speculative markets are examined for their potential to 
hedge the systemic risk accepted by the government. The results indicate that the risk 
reduction achievable by hedging is appreciable. Duncan and Myers (2000) develop an 
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insurance model to investigate the role of catastrophic risk in contributing to inadequate or 
incomplete crop insurance coverage. A long-run insurance market equilibrium is defined 
assuming risk averse farmers and insurance firms because of incomplete opportunities for 
diversifying or capitalizing the catastrophic risk. Results indicate that high levels of 
catastrophic risk can reduce coverage levels, increase premium and, if high enough, lead to 
complete breakdown of the market. This occurs because catastrophic risk causes insurance 
firms to act as if they are risk averse and average risk can not be reduced simply by 
expanding their portfolio of crop insurance contracts. 
Wang and Zhang (2003) doubt the belief that a private market for crop insurance is 
doomed to fail because of the systemic risk existing in crop yield. In their paper, they take a 
spatial statistics approach to examine the effectiveness of risk pooling for crop insurance 
under correlation. They argue that a critical ingredient for risk pooling is that the portfolio 
variance of mean losses decreases as exposure units increases. So, one way to measure the 
effectiveness of risk pooling is to see how small the variance of mean losses is compared 
with the average variance of each individual loss. Their empirical study shows that the yields 
for the three crops (corn, soybeans and wheat) present zero or negative correlation when two 
counties are far apart, which complies with a weaker condition than independence, finite-
range positive dependence. Hence, they impute the failure to effectively pool crop loss risk is 
the insurers’ failure to sufficiently diversify risk across space.  
The Wang and Zhang (2003) results imply that the existence of systemic risk does not 
necessarily justify Federal intervention in U.S. crop insurance markets.  But it could be that 
the costs of achieving sufficient spatial diversification so that aggregate risks are acceptable 
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to either an insurance company alone or an insurance company working with a private re-
insurance company, are so high as to be prohibitive.   
One practical cost in achieving sufficient poolability is the actual measurement of 
aggregate risk in any insurance company’s book of business.  The approaches of Miranda 
and Glauber and Wang and Zhang require fairly sophisticated quantitative tools of analysis. 
Presumably, insurance companies would need to apply these methods to existing and 
prospective books of business to determine the degree of aggregate risk for each. The 
objective of this paper is the development of an alternative approach for determining the 
aggregate risk of a book of business. Development of such a method should lower the cost of 
assessing aggregate risk of any give book of business.   
The method is developed using hail loss cost data of corn for each township of Iowa in 
years 1985 to 2000. Loss cost is defined as the ratio of losses paid out to insured liability. It 
is the proportion of the premium rate that is applicable solely to loss, without provision for 
company expenses or profits. The existence of a private hail insurance market in the United 
States indicates that hail-caused yield loss risk can be made poolable. The essential 
difference between crop insurance and hail insurance lies in the level of risk dependence 
across space (Skees and Barnett). The higher the level of risk dependence across space, the 
lower the risk poolability. Given a book of business, hail insurance providers could assess its 
degree of poolability using a stochastic simulation model of insurance indemnities to 
compute the variability of total indemnities paid. However, this procedure is complicated and 
time-consuming because it requires development of hail simulation models, estimation of the 
degree of spatial covariance and trend. Indemnities need to be simulated and proper 
distributions of involved variables need to be investigated. In addition, the procedure needs 
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to be repeated in order to evaluate risk poolability for every book of business. This paper 
develops a method to measure risk poolability of any specific book of business quickly by 
simply knowing a few key statistics of the given book of business.  
The development proceeds as follows. First, a spatial variogram is estimated and a 
theoretical model of loss cost resulting from hail damage in Iowa is fit to the empirical data. 
Thus, we explicitly model hail loss using a spatial statistical approach. Next, hail losses are 
simulated for a wide range of books of business using Monte Carlo simulation. And finally, a 
regression model is estimated that captures the essence of the Monte Carlo simulation.  This 
model can then be used to quickly estimate the degree of poolability of any given book of 
business.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Spatial concepts 
The degree of spatial dependence of loss cost is the key factor determining risk 
poolability of a book of business in hail insurance. What is spatial dependence? An intuitive 
answer is that things are (positively) spatially dependent if quantities that are located close 
together are more similar than quantities that are located farther apart. If loss costs of 
customers are independent, then the risk for the book of business is insurable. The higher the 
spatial dependence of loss cost, the less able are insurance companies to pool their risks 
across customers. 
To measure spatial dependence, we use the spatial variogram which is defined as 
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follows. For locations is  and js  and associated random variables )( isZ and )( jsZ , the 
variogram is  
1( ) var{ ( ) ( )} ,
2i j i j i j
s s Z s Z s all s s Dγ − ≡ − ∈  
where D  is a collection of points of dR  at which some type of “event” has occurred.  
To calculate a sample variogram, suppose that ( ){ }=E Z s μ ; ,s D∀ ∈  then we would have  
21( ) [ ( ) ( )]
2i j i j
s s E Z s Z sγ − = −                                       (3.1) 
(3.1) suggests using the average of squared differences in data values to represent ( )γ ⋅ . For a 
given displacement h, if we have observations from a set of pairs of 
locations },...,1,;:),{()( njihsssshN jiji ==−≡ , this is in fact what we would do, and a 
sample variogram for this displacement would be 
2
( )
1( ) { ( ) ( )} ,
2 ( )
d
i j
N h
h Z s Z s h R
N h
γ = − ∈∑  
where )(hN  is the number of pairs in the set )(hN . Without repeated observations at the 
same displacement, we will not have sets )(hN . In fact, typically we will not have more than 
a few pairs of observations with the same displacement. To deal with this problem, we use 
the idea of tolerance region. Suppose, in a given set of data, there are m  distinct 
displacement values. Choose k of these values ,,...,1),( kllh =  and define tolerance regions 
as ( ( )), 1,..., ,T h l l k=  then the set of paired locations with distance within the corresponding 
tolerance region can be defined as   
.,...1))},((:),{())(( kllhTsssslhN jiji =∈−≡  
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We will consider two of the most common variogram models in this analysis. Both 
models make the assumption that displacement between two locations )( ji ss − enters the 
variogram only in terms of distance ( )ij i jd s s= − . The first is the exponential variagram 
model 
0 0
( | )
(1 exp( / )) 0
h
h
a b h c h
γ θ =⎧= ⎨ + − − ≠⎩  
Where ),,( cba=θ , with 0,0 ≥≥ ba and 0≥c . The second is the spherical variogram model 
   3
0 0
( | ) (1.5 ( / ) 0.5 ( / ) ) 0
h
h a b h c h c h c
a b h c
γ θ
=⎧⎪= + ⋅ − ⋅ < ≤⎨⎪ + ≥⎩
 
where ),,( cba=θ , with 0,0 ≥≥ ba and 0≥c . Both variogram models are characterized by 
the same set of parameters as follows. The range c  is the distance at which the variogram 
reaches a maximum (if it does). The interpretation of the range is that it is the distance 
beyond which ( )Z s h+ and ( )Z s are no longer correlated. The sill a b+  is the value of the 
variogarm when evaluated at any distance greater than or equal to the range. The sill is 
usually a constant number. The nugget a  presents micro-scale variance.  Clearly, 0)0( =γ  if 
h =0. But it may not be true that  0)/( →θγ h  as 0→h . If ah →)/( θγ  as 0→h , then a  
is called the nugget. The nugget is how much of the variation of the response variable cannot 
be explained spatially. Figure 3.1 illustrates how the shape of the variogram changes as the 
distance increases for exponential and spherical models, where the x-axis denotes distance 
and the y-axis denotes the value of variogram. 
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3.2.2 Variogram estimation 
 
Loss cos data is available only at the township level of disaggregation. To give a better 
understanding of the size of a township, we include a map of townships in Jasper County in 
Iowa as shown in Figure 3.2. There are 36 sections (640 acres per section) in a township with 
one square mile for each section. Thus a perfectly square township is 36 square miles in area. 
This means that the distance from the center of a township to the center of a neighboring 
township is about 10 kilometers. There are a total of 1,626 townships in Iowa. Hail loss cost 
data of corn for each township in Iowa from 1985 to 2000 is obtained from NCIS (National 
Crop Insurance Services). For each township, we use the X and Y coordinates of the area 
centroid to indicate the location of the corresponding township. The X and Y coordinates are 
expressed in terms of Euclidian distance from a location in northeast corner of state 
Nebraska. 
It may be the case that hail loss costs exhibit spatial trend, increasing in one direction 
or another. Figure 3.3 maps the average hail loss cost by township over all the years 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Exponential variogram model (left) and spherical variogram model (right) 
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Figure 3.2. Townships in Jasper County, Iowa 
 
investigated. It is clearly showed that the average loss cost is higher in Northwest, West 
Central and South Central sections of Iowa, and it gets lower and lower as we move to the 
East Central and Southeast sections of the state.  
To measure spatial correlation of loss cost, we need to detrend the loss cost data and 
carry out analysis based on the residuals. Generally, the median polish method is used to 
remove the spatial trend (Cressie, 1993). However, we can not use this method to 
detrend the data since more than 50 percent of the loss cost observations are zero each year. 
Thus the median is also zero. Instead, we fit a Tobit model to estimate the trend. 
The no program case in the WTP scenario and the all programs case in the WTA 
scenario can be regarded as base cases. Any acreage distortion effects can be analyzed by 
comparing the results in each scenario with the corresponding base case. The acreage 
decisions indicate that when there is no yield penalty, the farmer will choose to plant 100% 
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Figure 3.3. Average hail loss cost of townships in Iowa from 1985 to 2000 
 
of his land to corn because corn has an expected profit higher than that of soybeans. With a 
100% acreage allocation for corn in every case, we find no acreage 
The no program case in the WTP scenario and the all programs case in the WTA 
scenario can be regarded as base cases. Any acreage distortion effects can be analyzed by 
comparing the results in each scenario with the corresponding base case. The acreage 
decisions indicate that when there is no yield penalty, the farmer will choose to plant 100% 
of his land to corn because corn has an expected profit higher than that of soybeans. With a 
100% acreage allocation for corn in every case, we find no acreage 
The reason for choosing a Tobit model is that the loss cost takes either positive values or 
zeros which is actually a censored dependent variable with all the negative values being 
reported as zero. Namely, for each individual year, loss cost is regressed on X and Y 
coordinates according to the following linear form 
εβββ +⋅+⋅+= YXLC 210                                        (3.2) 
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In (3.2), LC is the loss cost of hail damage which takes value of either zero or positive 
numbers, X andY are the X and Y coordinates of the area centroid of each township. The 
estimation is carried out through a toolbox, econometrics, associated with the Matlab 
software. After fitting the model, we performed a likelihood ratio test with the null 
hypothesis of 021 == ββ . We conclude that there is no spatial trend in loss cost if we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis. Otherwise we conclude that there is spatial trend for the specific 
year. The year-by-year regression and likelihood ratio test indicate that there is spatial trend 
in loss cost for each year from 1985 to 2000. Therefore, we detrend the data by subtracting 
the predicted loss costs which are the fitted values of linear regression (3.2) from the original 
loss costs to get the residuals.  
Now for each year, we have detrended loss cost for each township in Iowa. Together 
with location of each township, variogram estimation can be carried out through the use of 
“geoR” package associated with R software which provides programs to calculate spatial 
variograms. We first estimate spatial variogram of loss cost assuming isotropy which means 
that the displacement between two locations enters the variogram only in terms of distance, 
but not in terms of direction. We divide all possible paired distances into 10 bins with 0-10 
kilometers as the first bin, 10-20 kilometers as the second bin, and so on. For any given 
township, the number of townships within 10 kilometers is about eight. Of course, the 
number of paired townships with distance within 10 kilometers will be much larger if 
considering all possible paired townships. Instead of computing variogram of pairs of points 
which have exactly the same distance, we calculate variogram for pairs of points which have 
a distance within a range, for instance, 0-10 kilometers, 10-20 kilometers, and so on. Each 
bin can be regarded as a tolerance region of the mid-point distance of the bin. A user of the 
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program is asked to provide parameter values for the minimum distance, the maximum 
distance and the number of bins considered. The minimum distance and the maximum 
distance define the range of distances at which variogram will be estimated. The maximum 
distance is set at 100 kilometers by trial and error which is much larger than the estimated 
range. When the paired distance is this big, there is surely no spatial dependence. The 
minimum distance and the number of bins can be decided according to the tradeoff between 
big bins and small bins. Big bins imply a lot of squared differences to average across so that 
the estimated variogram associated with the mid-point distance of the bin has smaller 
variance. Small bins imply that the estimated variograms at distances in the bin are good 
approximation of variogram associated with the mid-point distance of the bin. We then 
estimate variogram assuming anisotropy which means that the displacement between two 
locations enters the variogram not only in terms of distance, but also in terms of direction. 
Accordingly, in addition to a division of 10 bins, we also divide distances according to 
directions. For a specific point, we consider totally four different directions: horizontal 
direction (0-degree direction), vertical direction (90-degree direction), north-east to south-
west direction (45-degree direction) and north-west to south-east direction (135-degree 
direction). In each direction, isotropy is assumed. We apply the concept of tolerance region 
here which is 45-degree around each of the four directions in addition to division of bins. For 
instance, for the north-east to south-west direction, we consider all the points which are 
located in the fan-shape area from 22.5 degree to 67.5 degree and in the fan-shape area from 
202.5 degree to 247.5 degree. In this region, we calculate the variogram for pairs of points 
which have distances within a bin, for instance, 0-10 kilometers, 10-20 kilometers, and so on. 
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3.2.3 Test for isotropy 
For each year, we can get a vector of variograms for the isotropy case and four vectors 
of variogram for the anisotropy case, with one vector for each direction. The variogram 
vectors have a dimension of 1-by-10 since we set the number of bins equal to 10 in the 
program. Stacking the 16 estimated variograms for each bin of the ten bins for both isotropy 
case and the four anisotropy cases, we can perform a hypothesis test with the null hypothesis 
that the spatial variogram of loss cost is isotropic. We apply ANOVA to two regressions. 
One is an unrestricted regression. The other is a restricted regression with the restriction that 
the corresponding model parameters for each of the four directions are equal. We apply the 
spherical model to do the hypotheses test first because this model is most commonly used. 
The exponential model will be used to do the hypothesis test later. If the p-value of the F 
statistic from the AVOVA table is greater than 0.05, we conclude, at a 5% significance level, 
that there are no significant difference between corresponding parameter values for the four 
directions and thus the spatial variogram is isotropic. Otherwise, we conclude there is 
significant difference between corresponding parameter values for the four directions and the 
spatial variogram is anisotropic. (3.3) gives the unrestricted regression in terms of  
exponential model in each direction. 
  0 0 0 0 45 45 45 45
90 90 90 90 135 135 135 135
( (1 exp( / ))) ( (1 exp( / )))
( (1 exp( / ))) ( (1 exp( / ))) (3.3)
Y D a b h c D a b h c
D a b h c D a b h c
= ⋅ + − − + ⋅ + − − +
⋅ + − − + ⋅ + − −  
whereY is the response variable, here the stacked directional variogram in our problem. h , 
the explanatory variable, is the pair distances. Recall that we divide all possible distances into 
10 bins. For each bin, we use the mid value of the bin as distance h . For example, for bin 
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with a range from 0 to 10 kilometers, h =5, and for bin with a range from 10 to 20 
kilometers, h =15, etc. 90450 ,, DDD and 135D  are dummy variables indicating which 
direction is under consideration. I use subscript 0, 45, 90 and 135 to represent the four 
directions: 0-degree direction, 45-degree direction, 90-degree direction and 135-degree 
direction. 90450 ,, aaa and 135a are nugget parameter of the spherical model for corresponding 
directions. 90450 ,, ccc and 135c  are range parameter of the model for corresponding directions. 
9090454500 ,, bababa +++  and 135135 ba +  are sill parameter of the model for corresponding 
directions. If 1359045013590450 , bbbbaaaa ====== and 13590450 cccc === , we get the 
restricted regression as (3.4).     
(1 exp( / ))Y a b h c= + − −                                                  (3.4)                         
whereY is the response variable, the stacked isotropic variogram. h is still the explanatory 
variable which is the distance between pair of points. baa +, and c are corresponding model 
parameters of nugget, sill and range.  
The p-value of the F statistic in the ANOVA table is 0.276 for spherical model, which 
is larger than 0.05. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance level 
and conclude that there is no statistical evidence supporting anisotrophy. The p-value of the F 
statistic from the ANOVA analysis is 0.281 for exponential model. We fail to reject the null 
hypothesis at 5% significance level and conclude again that the variogram of loss cost is 
isotropic. Thus we assume that loss cost is isotropic. 
 
3.2.4 Variogram models 
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Given isotropy, we choose between exponential model and spherical model to fit the 
detrended loss cost data. The estimation results are shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.  
Parameters estimated for both models are ,a b and c which are the nugget, difference of sill 
and nugget, and range of the models. The second and the third column give the parameter 
estimates and corresponding standard error of the estimates. The fourth and fifth column give 
the t statistics and corresponding p-values. The last column shows the  
significance levels of the estimates. It is clear that the spherical model fits the data better than 
exponential model does since the p-value of each parameter estimate is smaller in spherical 
model than in exponential model. The significance level of those estimates in the spherical 
model is close to or less than 5%. The estimated nugget in the spherical model is 4.24. The 
estimated sill is 7.93, which is also the maximum variogram. The nugget indicates that about 
48% of the variation of the response variable can be explained spatially. The estimated range 
is 41.02 kilometers which implies that, at this distance, the spatial variogram reaches the 
maximum and loss costs are no longer correlated when the corresponding locations are 
greater than 41 kilometers, which is a distance of about four townships. Figure 3.4 shows 
 
                                Table 3.1. Estimation results of exponential model 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
a  3.56 2.49 1.43 0.15 
b  4.47 2.34 1.91 0.06 
c   15.15    14.25 1.06 0.29 
                    
                       Table 3.2. Estimation results of spherical model 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
a  4.24 1.62 2.62 0.01 
b  3.69 1.65 2.34   0.027 
c   41.02    22.66 1.81 0.07 
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Figure 3.4. Spatial variogram model fit 
 
 
the fit of the two models. It is clear that the estimated range is larger in spherical model than 
that in exponential model. 
                  
3.3 Monte Carlo simulation of a wide range of books of business 
The primary objective of this study is to develop a method for easily estimating the 
degree of risk poolability given an insurance portfolio. For a given book of business, the 
hypotheticalcrop insurer faces a portfolio risk which can be measured by the coefficient 
of variation of total indemnities paid:  
( )
( )
i
i
I
i
i
V I
CV
E I
=
∑
∑  
where iI is the random indemnity payment to customer i . If the risks are independent across 
insured customers, the coefficient of variation of total indemnities is zero if enough 
customers are insured. Otherwise, the coefficient of variation is greater than zero. For hail 
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insurance, the higher the spatial correlation of lost cost, the higher the coefficient of variation 
of indemnities.  
The objective of this study is to develop a method to quickly assess the poolability of a 
book of business. Accomplishing this requires the simulation of a series of books of business 
with a range of coefficients of variation of indemnities of hail insurance for different books 
of business in Iowa. In order to do the simulation, we need to understand first what the most 
important factors of a book of business are which affect its risk poolability. After 
investigation, we find out that the number of customers, the location concentration and 
acreage concentration of those customers play significant roles. The number of customers is 
simply the total number of customers in a given book of business. Because we assume that 
there is only one customer in each township, the number of customers is also the number of 
townships in the book of business. Location concentration measures how geographically 
disperse customers are for a given book of business. A book of business can be quite 
concentrated in a few townships or it can consist of customers that are widely spread over the 
entire state. Acreage concentration measures how disperse the size of customers are in terms 
of acreage insured for a given book of business. The combination of geographic dispersion 
along with a lack of acreage concentration creates a more diversified book of business. It is a 
very different situation when every customer has the same number of insured acres compared 
to when small number of customers has a large volume of insured acres in a book of 
business. 
Thus we have many combinations of variability to simulate: variability in the number 
of customers, variability in location concentration and variability in acreage concentration. 
The one thing fixed in the simulation is the total number of acres insured which is fixed at 
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1,000,000. The purpose of this simulation is to create a response variable which measures 
portfolio risks and a design matrix as well which contains the levels of explanatory variables 
measuring diversity of a book of business. An analogy is the rating method for Revenue 
Assurance. The premium rate for a given farm is a function of APH yield, APH rate, 
coverage levels and price volatility. The goal of this study is to relate portfolio risk to 
diversification measures of the portfolio based on Monte Carlo simulation of a large number 
of different books of business. 
For a book of business with N customers, I vary location concentration by randomly 
sampling N customers from different subsets of the 1,590 townships. Different subsets are 
obtained by changing the ranges of X coordinate and Y coordinate simultaneously. The state 
as a whole is also a subset when the lower limits of X, Y coordinates are set as the minimum 
values of the coordinates and the upper limits of X, Y coordinates are set as the maximum 
values of the coordinates. The standard beta distribution with parameters p and q is chosen to 
simulate insured acreage for each customer in a book of business. To facilitate a mean-
preserving spread in variability, we set p=q and vary the values of p and q to get different 
acreage concentration. The beta distribution is ideal for this task because of its flexibility. A 
low variance density can be defined by setting high values of p and q. For example, p=q=50 
represent a nearly uniform spatial distribution. We can choose a fat-tailed, unimodal density 
(p=q=2) to represent medium spatial variability and a U-shaped density (p=q=0.5) to 
represent a high degree of concentration. These three density functions are graphed in Figure 
3.5.  
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Figure 3.5. Three beta density functions measuring spatial variability 
 
There are many different indexes to measure concentration. We are particularly 
interested in two of them. One is the out-of-range proportion index, the other is the 
Herfindahl index.  
From the spatial models we know that when the distance between any two customers is 
greater than the estimated range, the hail damage losses are essentially independent no matter 
where the two customers are located. Thus the variance in total indemnities paid will be 
small. Inspired by this fact, we come up with the first measure, 
out-of-range proportion index, which is the weighted proportion of paired distances 
exceeding the estimated range. We will call this measure proportion index for simplicity 
 Specifically, if the distance between customer i and customer j  is greater than the range, 
count it as one, otherwise, count it as zero. Weight the count by the insured acreage of 
customer i multiplied by the insured acreage of customer j . Summing over those weighted 
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counts, dividing by the weighted counts when all pair distances are greater than the range, we 
can get the proportion index. Mathematically,  
∑∑
∑∑
= >
= >= n
i
n
ij
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n
ij
jiij
aa
aaI
indexproportion
1
1_  
where ijI  is the indicator variable which takes value of one if distance between customer i  
and customer j  is greater than the range or zero otherwise; ia  and ja are the insured acreage 
of customer i  and customer j , respectively; n is the number of customers in a book of 
business. Proportion index takes values in a range from zero to one. For a given book of 
business, if all the customers are farther apart from each other than the estimated range, the 
measure takes the value of one. If all the customers are close together and all pair distances 
are smaller than the range, then the measure takes value of zero. Since the estimated range is 
only 41 kilometers and we assume that there is only one customer in each township, it is very 
unlikely to get a value as small as zero except when the number of customers in the book of 
business is really small and they are located in an area with the maximum pair distance 
smaller than 41 kilometers. It is obvious that proportion index depends on the number of 
customers and location concentration of a given book of business. 
The Herfindahl index is a simple, yet sophisticated way of measuring acreage 
concentration. The Herfindahl index is obtained by squaring the written share of insurance of 
each customer, and then summing those squares.  
2
1
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where ia  is the insured acreage of customer i and A is the total insured acreage of the given 
book of business. Thus 
A
ai is the written share of customer i  and n is the number of customers 
for the book of business. For example, consider a hypothetical book of business with three 
equal-sized customers. Each of them has same acreage insured, thus each has a share of 1/3. 
The Herfindahl index is computed as follows: 
3/1)3/1()3/1()3/1(_ 222 =++=indexHerfindahl  
Now, we are ready to carry out Monte Carlo simulations. Given historical lost cost for 
each township from year 1985 to 2000, taking average across years gives the value of 
average loss cost for each township, which is a good starting point for measuring the 
actuarially fair insurance rate for the township. There may be a big difference in average loss 
cost among townships that are close to each other, which pose a practical problem for 
insurance in real life. The reason is, for townships close to each other, the insurance rate 
tends to be similar. To solve this problem, a quadratic model relating average loss cost with 
X and Y coordinates is fitted to smooth average loss cost across space. The predicted loss 
cost is then taken as the insurance rate for corresponding townships. Figure 
3.6 maps the insurance rate for each township in Iowa. 
The historical probability that hail damage occurs in a specific township is obtained by 
taking the ratio of the count of years when damage occurred to the count of years when a loss 
cost record is available. This historical probability is called the threshold 
probability in this study. For some townships in some years, there is no record at all, we 
disregard them since we do not know whether there is damage or not. Townships which have 
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Figure 3.6. Predicted insurance rates of townships in Iowa 
 
never had a hail-damage from 1985 to 2000 are excluded in this analysis. Therefore, a total 
of 1590 townships are the subjects of interest. 
Conditional on a positive loss cost, loss cost is exponentially distributed (Benktander, 
1977). Namely, the density function is of the form as represented by (3.5). 
 )exp()( xxp ⋅−⋅= ββ         ( )0≥x                                    (3.5) 
where 0>β is the scale parameter of the distribution and the mean of the loss costs. Figure 
3.7 shows the sample distribution of loss costs conditional on positive loss cost for a sample 
of adjacent thirty townships. With the predicted insurance rate and threshold probability for 
each township, we can easily solve for parameter beta by simply taking the ratio of insurance 
rate and threshold probability of the corresponding townships. For a specific township, 
conditional on positive loss cost, this calibrated value is the mean value of loss costs of the 
township. 
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               Figure 3.7. Sample distribution of loss costs conditional on positive loss cost 
 
We assume that there is only one customer in each township. If there is more than one 
customer in a township, we can combine their acreage and regard them as one customer. 
Therefore, the maximum number of customers available in a book of business is 1590. With 
this assumption, the spatial correlation of hail damage for different townships (customers) 
can be appropriately imposed.  
Given a book of business, pair-wise distance of the customers can be calculated by 
equation (3.6). 
22 )()( jijiij yyxxd −+−=                                         (3.6)            
where ijd  is the distance of township i  and township j . ),(),,( jjii yxyx are the coordinate 
values of township i  and township j , respectively. Pair-wise correlation of hail-damage loss 
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costs assuming spherical variogram model is a function of the corresponding pair-wise 
distance as shown in (3.7). 
31 1.5 / 0.5 ( / )
(3.7)
0
ij ij ij
ij
ij
d c d c d c
correlation
d c
⎧ − ⋅ + ⋅ ≤⎪= ⎨ >⎪⎩
 
where ijncorrelatio  is the spatial correlation of hail damage loss cost of township i  and 
township j ; c is the estimated range beyond which there is no spatial correlation any more. 
For a given book of business with N customers in N townships, we simulate loss cost 
for 500 years for each customer. To do this, first N columns of independent standard normal 
deviates are drawn. Each column has 500 rows corresponding to the 500 years. Cholesky 
decomposition is applied to the correlation matrix. Correlation is imposed upon the N 
columns of independent standard normal deviates to get N columns of correlated standard 
normal deviates. Then, we calculate the cumulative probability for each deviate column by 
column which has a range from zero to one. Recall that conditional on positive loss cost, loss 
cost is exponentially distributed with parameter beta. So, for a specific township (customer), 
we pick out those cumulative probabilities which are smaller than the threshold probability of 
the township and transform them to exponential deviates with expected value equal to the 
corresponding parameter beta of that township. For those cumulative probabilities which are 
greater than the threshold probability, we set corresponding loss cost as zero. In this way, for 
a given township, we have a simulation where there is a threshold probability that hail 
damage occurs and a probability of one minus threshold probability that no hail damage 
occurs at all. The same procedure is applied to other townships. The simulated indemnities of 
a book of business can be calculated by the equation: Indemnity=Liability ×  simulated loss 
cost ×  acre shares of the customers in the book of business. The result is a vector with 
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dimension of 500-by-1. Each row corresponds to an indemnity for a single simulated year. In 
our simulation, we set liability as 100 for simplicity. Finally, we are able to calculate the 
coefficient of variation of indemnities for the book of business. Given simulated indemnities, 
the coefficient variation of indemnities is equal to the standard deviation of indemnities 
divided by mean value of indemnities.  
The proportion index and the Herfindahl index of a book of business can be computed 
accordingly. Recall that the standard beta distribution is chosen to simulate insured acreage 
for each customer and the total number of acreage insured is set as 1,000,000. For a book of 
business with N customers, N acreage deviates can be drawn according to the standard beta 
distribution. Acreage concentration can be varied by setting different values to the 
distribution parameters. Dividing each beta deviate by the sum of all N deviates, we can get 
acreage share of each customer. Squaring those shares and summing over the squares gives 
the Herfindahl index of the book of business. Consequently, insured acreage of each 
customer can be obtained by multiplying corresponding acreage share with the total number 
of acreage insured. Together with information of pair distance of customers, proportion index 
for the book of business can be calculated according to the corresponding formula. 
 
3.4 Analytical results 
For a given book of business, the proportion index which measures the weighted 
proportion of pair distances exceeding the range, the Herfindahl index which measures the 
acreage concentration and the coefficient of variation of indemnities can be computed. This 
given book of business is counted as one case. 10,000 different books of business are 
simulated in this study. Now, we are ready to fit a model which represents the relationship 
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between the coefficient of variation of indemnities and the portfolio diversification measures. 
The coefficient of variation of indemnities of a book of business is the response variable (Y ). 
The portfolio diversification variables are the explanatory variables, here the proportion 
index ( 1X ) and the Herfindahl index ( 2X ).The models and the adjusted
2R from the 
corresponding regressions are reported in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. 
First, the proportion index is included as the only explanatory variable in the model. 
We fit a linear model, a quadratic model and a power model in turn. The corresponding 
adjusted 2R from the regression varies from 0.13 to 0.21. This implies that the proportion 
index can only explain about 20% of the variation in the coefficient of variation of 
indemnities. We then use the Herfindahl index as the only explanatory variable and fit linear 
model, quadratic model and power model in turn. The adjusted 2R from each of the three 
models are high, varying from 0.85 to 0.98. Compared with the proportion index, Herfindahl 
index accounts for much more of the variation in the coefficient of variation of indemnities. 
Last, we include both proportion index and Herfindahl index in the regression and fit a linear 
model, quadratic model and Cobb-Douglas model one by one. The adjusted 2R from each of 
the three models are quite similar to that of the fitted models when Herfindahl index is the 
only explanatory variable.  
From the adjusted 2R in the above three tables, it is obvious that Cobb-Douglas model 
or log-transformed model with both Herfindahl index and proportion index in the regression 
has the best fit of the nine possible models. The adjusted 2R is 0.9855, which indicates that 
about 98% of the variation in coefficient of variation of indemnity can be explained by 
proportion index and Herfindahl index both in logarithm. The estimated parameters of the  
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    Table 3.3. Models including only the proportion index 
Model Adjusted 2R  
110 XY ⋅+= ββ  0.2034 
2
12110 XXY ⋅+⋅+= βββ  0.2093 
βα 1XY ⋅=  or 1logloglog XY ⋅+= βα  0.1377 
 
    Table 3.4. Models including only the Herfindahl index 
Model Adjusted 2R  
210 XY ⋅+= ββ  0.8538 
2
22210 XXY ⋅+⋅+= βββ  0.9185 
βα 2XY ⋅=  or 2logloglog XY ⋅+= βα  0.9832 
 
   Table 3.5. Models with both explanatory variables 
Model Adjusted 2R  
22110 XXY ⋅+⋅+= βββ  0.8854 
215
2
24
2
1322110 XXXXXXY ββββββ +++++=  0.9351 
2
2
1
1
ββα XXY ⋅=  or  2211 loglogloglog XXY ββα ++=  0.9855 
                        
Cobb-Douglas model are shown in Table 3.6. All the three regression coefficients are 
significant at 1% significance level since all corresponding p- values are 
smaller than 0.01. In addition, the correlation between 1log X  and 2log X  is -0.33. Therefore, 
multicollinearity is not a big issue here. 
 
                                 Table 3.6. Parameter estimation of the Cobb-Douglas model 
Variable DF Parameter Est. Std Err. t Pr>|t| 
Intercept 1 0.5735 0.0128 74.7 <.0001 
LogX1 1 -0.1997 0.0145 -49.6 <.0001 
LogX2 1 0.4513 0.0006 751.5 <.0001 
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We fit models to several other sets of simulations and get results which are very 
similar. Therefore, we choose the Cobb-Douglas model. Namely, the coefficient of variation               
of indemnities has the relationship with proportion index and Herfindahl index for a book of 
business as represented in (3.8): 
4513.0
2
1997.0
17745.1 XXY ⋅⋅= −                                             (3.8) 
whereY is coefficient of variation of indemnities, 1X  is proportion index and 2X is 
Herfindahl index. The coefficient of 1.7745 is obtained by taking exponential of the 
estimated value of the intercept.  
 One issue with these results is that when the Herfindahl index as the only explanatory 
variable is included in the regression, the adjusted 2R  is as high as 0.983. This means the 
Herfindahl index by itself can explain 98% of the variation in coefficient of variation of 
indemnities of a book of business. One may wonder why we bother to have more than one 
explanatory variable. It seems there is very little left for the proportion index to explain after 
adjusting for the effects of Herfindahl index on both proportion index and response variable. 
We use proportion index to indicate the location concentration of the book of business. We 
include this measure in the model because we believe this measure is a very important 
diversification measure for portfolios of risk. The reason why proportion index seems to have 
little explanatory power in our model is that, in hail insurance, the range beyond which 
spatial correlation does not exist is quite small relative to the size of Iowa. It is only 41 
kilometers in Iowa, which is a distance of about four townships. Most customers of an 
ordinary book of business are far apart from each other than the range. When the pair 
distances of customers are greater than the range, the locations of the customers do not matter 
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any more. Thus a high value of proportion index is an indication that location concentration 
is not a big issue for the book of business. When the range is really small, the proportion 
index takes values which clump to percentages as high as one hundred. In our simulation of 
different books of business, the proportion index rarely takes small values as shown in Figure 
3.8 which is the very situation that proportion index really matters. For example, there is a 
book of business with only ten customers. Nine of them are close together with a maximum 
distance less than the range. The other one is far away from the rest of the nine. Suppose that 
hail damage occurs to one of the nine customers, chances are hail damage occurs to all the 
other neighboring customers. The risk of this book of business mainly lies in the risk of the  
 
 
Figure 3.8. Scatter plot of CV of indemnities vs. proportion index 
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nine close-located customers. The location concentration of this book of business is very high 
and proportion index very low, which is the situation that proportion index matters. To 
confirm this idea, I checked the simulation to see what happened when the simulated 
proportion index is small. I pick out the smallest 1,000 proportion index and corresponding 
coefficient of variation of indemnities. Regressing coefficient of variation of indemnities 
onto proportion index, both in logarithm form, I get an adjusted 2R  as 
high as 0.316. This value implies that proportion index in logarithm can explain 31.6% of the 
variation of response variable in logarithm. This value is much higher than 0.1377 which is 
what I get from the same regression using all the simulated proportion index and 
corresponding coefficient of variation. This shows that proportion index measure does matter 
when the location concentration of a book of business is high.  
In addition to hail insurance, there are other lines of insurances of which portfolio risks 
are determined by the risk dependence across space, particularly, crop insurance. For crop 
loss risk, the range is much larger than that for hail-caused loss risk. A study by Wang and 
Zhang (2003) shows that the crop yields have a clear pattern of finite range positive 
dependence and the distance for the positive dependence is at most 570 miles. There are 
many more cases where the proportion index takes smaller value than in the simulation of 
hail insurance portfolios. Since the goal of this paper is to illustrate a method which can 
quickly tell the degree of risk poolability of a book of business with spatial correlated losses 
involved, proportion index is needed in the model as a very important measure of portfolio 
diversification.  
There is a reason why the Herfindahl index as the only explanatory variable can explain 
about 98% of the variation of response variable. The Herfindahl index takes on values which 
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are concentrated close to zero because if each customer in a portfolio has similar insured 
acreage, then the Herfindahl index value turns to be low. In our simulation, more than 90% 
of the cases have Herfindahl index values less than 0.2 as shown in Figure 3.9. These 
simulated cases play a decisive role in determining the relationship between coefficient of 
variation and Herfindahl index. It turns out that the good fit occurs when the Herfindahl 
index takes a value in this range. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to use both proportion index and Herfindahl index to measure the diversification 
of a book of business.  
Provided with the fitted model, how can we measure the risk poolability of a book of 
business in hail insurance? Given a book of business, the number of customers, the location 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Scatter plot of CV of indemnities vs. Herfindahl index 
Herfindahl index
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of customers and size of each customer are known. The proportion index and Herfindahl 
index can be easily calculated according to the formulas. Plugging the values of the 
proportion index and Herfindahl index of a book of business’s into the model, we can get, on 
average, a coefficient of variation of indemnities paid for the book of business. Miranda and 
Glauber (1997) report that the coefficient of variation of total indemnities paid is 15% on 
average for conventional crop-hail insurance in the United States. Our maximum simulated 
coefficient of variation of indemnities is higher than 15%. We choose 20% as the critical 
value and conclude that if the predicted value is greater than 20%, the book of business is not 
insurable, otherwise, it is. In our simulation, the coefficient of variation of indemnities paid 
for different books of business vary from 6% to 220%.  Books of business with smaller 
number of customers who locate closely and have very different insured acreage tend to have 
higher coefficient of variation of indemnities. While, books of business with large number of 
customers who locate far away from each other and have similar insured acreage are more 
likely to have smaller percentage variability. For example, a book of business with 30 
customers who are closely located in the east-north corner of the state of Iowa with high 
degree of concentration of incurred acreage has a 53.2% coefficient of variation of 
indemnities. Another book of business with 1,000 customers from widespread area of Iowa 
and have uniformly distributed insured acreage has a 9% coefficient of variation of 
indemnities. While the first case is not insurable, the second case is insurable.   
 
3.5 Conclusions 
Much work has been done on crop insurance in recent years. Only a couple of studies 
put effort on how to measure the risk poolability. No attempt has been given to measure risk 
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poolability of a given book of business in an easy and quick fashion. People can surely 
simulate losses and compute indemnities based on those draws for a given book of business. 
But this procedure is complicated and time-consuming. This study aims at providing a way to 
measure the risk poolability of a given book of business in an easy and quick fashion.  
Diversification plays a decisive role in determining the risk poolability of a given book 
of business. It turns out that the number of customers, the locations and insured acreage of 
each customer are important factors which determine the diversification of a book of 
business. Two measures are constructed based on those factors to measure diversification. 
One is proportion index which measures the weighted proportion of pair distances exceeding 
the estimated spatial range. The other is Herfindahl index which measures the concentration 
of acreage across customers. After investigation, I find that a Cobb-Douglas model capture 
the simulation procedure quite well. About 98% of variability of the risk poolability can be 
explained by the proportion index and Herfindahl index of the book of business.  
Although it is derived based on hail loss cost data from the state of Iowa, the model is 
directly applicable to a larger geographic area, assuming similar pattern of spatial correlation, 
in the sense that both proportion index and Herfindahl index are unitless. For crop insurance 
or other lines of insurance in which risk is spatially related, we can still apply this method to 
derive a new model to predict risk poolability of a given book of business. Of course, 
investigation of the spatial correlation of the corresponding risk is needed in constructing the 
new models. 
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CHAPTER 4. REDUCING BASIS RISK IN WEATHER INDEX 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Many argue that private crop insurance markets can not develop because of the 
systemic nature of risks inherent in crop insurance and because of asymmetric information 
problems (Skees and Reed, 1986; Nelson and Loehman, 1987; Chambers, 1989; Goodwin 
and Smith, 1995; Mirander and Glauber, 1997; Skees and Barnett, 1999; Duncan and Meyer, 
2000; Mason et al., 2003). Systemic risk in agriculture stems primarily from the impact of 
spatially correlated unfavorable weather events which result in high correlation among farm-
level yields, thereby defeating insurer efforts to pool risks across farms. Moral hazard and 
adverse selection induce high transaction costs to insurers who ultimately must pass these 
expenses onto insurance purchasers by loading premium rates. Despite these problems, 
government support crop insurance because it provides ex ante risk protection, rather than ex 
post forms of disaster assistance. For example, the U.S. government highly subsidizes 
premium to encourage participation in the crop insurance program. However, as a 
mechanism for providing subsidies, government premium subsidies are often inefficient and 
associated with high social cost (Hennessy, Babcock and Hayes, 1997; Hennessy, 1998; 
Skees, Hazell, and Miranda, 1999; Vedenov and Barnett, 2004). 
Concerns over the systemic nature of crop risks and costs of insuring farm-level crop 
yield have prompted area-based insurance products such as the Group Risk Plan (GRP) and 
Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) offered under the Federal Crop Insurance Program in 
the United States. Although these products overcome information asymmetry problems, the 
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insurance they provide at the county level results in high basis risk. In addition, they still 
suffer from a lack of poolability of insured risks.  
In recent years interest has increased in weather-based index contracts as alternative 
risk-management instrument in agricultural production. The underlying weather index is 
usually a weather variable or a function of multiple weather variables accumulated over a 
period of time. There are many advantages of weather index contracts over the traditional 
individual-yield and area-yield crop insurance. First, individual who use an index contract 
should be unable to influence the outcome that determines payment from the contract. 
Monitoring needs are reduced, which lowers transaction costs. Second, the indemnity 
structure is not directly tied to actual crop yield. This saves lost adjustment costs and 
eliminates the possibility of moral hazard. Adverse selection is minimized or eliminated 
because premium calculation is based on objective weather events which are independent of 
participation of producers in the program. And third, aggregating production risks across 
space may reduce the idiosyncratic risk in the aggregate portfolio, the insurer can then hedge 
the systemic weather risk using weather derivatives. 
The major concern associated with index contract is basis risk. In this sense, weather 
index insurance is similar to area-based insurance products. There are two layers of weather 
basis risk. The first layer, or the spatial basis risk, refers to the fact the weather index value 
defined at a weather station may not be the same as the realized weather index value at a 
specified location. The second layer, or the technological basis risk, refers to the fact that the 
underlying weather index is an imperfect hedge against risk exposure even if the underlying 
index and exposure being hedged correspond to the same location. As a result, producers 
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may not receive an indemnity even if he/she suffers a production loss, or alternatively, may 
receive an indemnity even though no loss has occurred. 
Many studies have been conducted about the potential application of weather index 
insurance in agricultural production. Most focus on the economic, pricing and institutional 
requirement of weather-related insurance products for agriculture (Skees et al., 2001; Mahul, 
2001; Martin, Barnett and Coble, 2001; Miranda and Vedenov, 2001; Turvey, 2001; Richards 
et al., 2004; Campbell and Diebold, 2005; Turvey, 2005). Only a handful of studies address 
the efficiency of weather derivatives as risk management instruments for agricultural 
production (Vedenov and Barnett, 2004; Woodard and Garcia, 2006; Deng et al., 2007). 
However, these studies either investigate hedging with non-local contracts or analyze farms 
where a weather station is available. Non-local contracts are inevitably plagued with the 
spatial basis risk problem. Efficiency analysis at a chosen farm where a weather station is 
available is of limited usage because the results can not be directly applied to other farms 
where weather station is not available. 
Basis risk has been cited as a primary concern for the implementation of weather 
hedges (Turvey, 2001; Brockett et al., 2004; Turvey, 2006; Deng et al., 2007). However, 
most of these studies put emphasis on solving the second layer of basis risk, leaving spatial 
basis risk as still an open question. As Richards et al. (2004) mentioned, economic research 
can do little to remedy the spatial basis risk problem. Paulson (2006) was the first to explore 
how to reduce spatial basis risk employing sophisticated spatial interpolation techniques. 
Paulson (2006) analyzed the spatial basis risk for a rainfall insurance policy designed to 
protect pastureland owner of Iowa against drought risk. The interpolation technique 
employed in his study, Bayesian kriging prediction, is one of the stochastic prediction 
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methods in geo-statistics (Cressie, 1993). There are two main approaches to address spatial 
dependence problems. One is the standard, well-developed geo-statistical approach. The 
other is the less-developed Markov random field (MRF) approach. The geo-statistical 
analysis is appropriate for data defined on both continuous and discrete fields as long as the 
data analyzed are generated from same stochastic process. The MRF approach explicitly 
models spatial dependence of data defined on lattice. Both geo-statistical approach and MRF 
approach have strengths and weaknesses in terms of operational and data-analytic aspects. 
Cressie et al. (1999) developed spatial prediction models for particulate matter from both 
geo-statistical approach and MRF approach. Their results indicate that the MRF approach to 
spatial prediction has promise in the sense that MRF model yields cross-validation prediction 
with smaller prediction mean squared error than that of geo-statistical approach. The more 
automated nature of estimation with the MRF model makes it easier to model multiple years 
of data. 
 In this study, a temperature insurance contract is designed to provide protection to 
corn growers in Iowa. The contract is essentially an exotic call option on the temperature 
index, cooling degree days, accumulated during the summer season (ACDD). The number of 
cooling degree days on a single day can be calculated as the difference of the daily average 
temperature and 65 degrees Fahrenheit. The insurance policy is rated using Monte Carlo 
simulation assuming that ACDD at a given location follows normal distribution. ACDD is 
interpolated for locations where recorded ACDD data is not available through MRF 
prediction. Both the geo-statistical model and the MRF model in addition to a naive multiple 
linear regression model, which assumes no underlying spatial correlation of ACDD, are fitted 
to the historical data. The results indicate that MRF is preferred in the sense that it has a 
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lower cross-validation prediction mean squared error and that it provides a straightforward 
extension to multiple years of data in model estimation.  
Although the emphasis of this analysis is on addressing spatial basis risk, technological 
basis risk is also addressed through the use of indemnity factor which can be obtained 
through linear regression relating corn yield losses to the temperature index rises. Potential 
performance of the proposed insurance policy is investigated through historical analysis from 
1980 to 2005. Given the high-level systemic nature of temperature, the proposed insurance 
policy is better supplied by large insurance companies or government agencies in the sense 
that a large portion of the aggregated portfolio’s total risk is left in the form of systemic 
weather risk after aggregating yield risks across space. The systemic weather risk could be 
securitized via the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and over-the-counter security markets. 
 
4.2 Relationship between ACDD and corn yields 
It is well accepted that high temperatures during the growing season can significantly 
hinder corn development. Agronomic experiments indicate that cooling degree days are more 
relevant to crop yields than outright temperature measurements (Schlenker et al., 2006). In 
this study, empirical evidence indicates that cooling degree days accumulated over the 
months June, July and August has a high correlation with corn yields in Iowa. For simplicity, 
we use ACDD to denote accumulated cooling degree days during the summer months. Data 
of corn yields in each of the nine Crop Reporting Districts (CRDs) in Iowa from 1980 to 
2006 is available from USDA-NASS. To account for the temporal and technology 
component, a simple linear trend is fit to corn yields for each CRD. The detrended 2006 
equivalent yields are then calculated by equation (4.1). 
 
89 
 
det 2006
tr
t t tr
t
YY Y
Y
=                                                      (4.1) 
Scatter plots of corn yields versus ACDD for every CRDs are investigated. The nine 
scatter plots have similar pattern with regard to the relationship between corn yields and 
ACDD across CRDs. Therefore, we only report the integrated scatter plot for the whole state 
as in Figure 4.1.  
The numbers in the figure are the last two digits of corresponding years of data 
involved. Figure 4.1 indicates that year 1993 corresponds to an outlier when the ACDD 
level is pretty normal but corn yields are the lowest in the historical time period investigated. 
It can be explained by the extreme moisture pressure due to the wet weather in year 1993.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Relationship between detrended state average corn yields and state average ACDD in Iowa 
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Table 4.1 shows the calculated correlation coefficients between ACDD and detrended 
corn yields for the nine CRDs in Iowa. The correlation analysis excluded data in 1993. The 
omission of data in 1993 is subjective. It is the judgment of the author that this year was such 
an outlier that its inclusion would unnecessarily bias the results. 
The correlation statistics and the scatter plot indicate that there is a strong negative 
relationship between ACDD and corn yields when ACDD is above a certain number (around 
300). Corn yields were extremely low in years 1983 and 1988 which correspond to two 
extremely hot years. The strong negative correlation between ACDD and corn yields 
indicates a possibility of using ACDD as an index in index insurance framework insuring 
against corn yield reduction. 
 
4.3 Data 
Monthly cooling degree days measured at weather stations in Iowa were obtained from 
NOAA-NCDC. The data used in this research is the accumulated cooling degree days during 
the summer season from 1980 to 2006. Accumulated cooling degree days during the summer 
season are calculated as the summation of cooling degree days of during June, July and 
August. Weather stations which have missing observations in any of the months June, July or 
August in a year were excluded from the set of observing stations in that year. So, the full 
data set of Iowa weather stations is reduced to only those 
 
   Table 4.1. Correlation between ACDD and corn yields for CRDs in Iowa 
CRDs CRD1 CRD2 CRD3 CRD4 CRD5 CRD6 CRD7 CRD8 CRD9 
Correlation -0.64 -0.54 -0.46 -0.72 -0.57 -0.58 -0.74 -0.65 -0.69 
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which provide ACDD measure in any of the 27 years. Because of the missing value issue, the 
number of weather stations providing ACDD records varies by year.  There are 53 weather 
stations which have ACDD records for the entire time period of 27 years. The ACDD data 
recorded at these 53 stations from 1980 to 2005 is used to fit models. ACDD data in 2006 is 
used for validation purposes. We call these 53 stations in-sample stations because models are 
fitted using records measured at those stations. We call all other stations left-aside stations. 
The number of left-aside stations varied from 59 to 73 from year to year. Left-aside stations 
are used to test the prediction power of different models through cross-validation approach. 
Weather stations at which data is collected are shown in Figure 4.2.  
The red dot in Figure 4.2 indicates in-sample stations and blue dot indicates left-aside 
stations. The left-aside stations in a single year are a subset of the left-aside stations shown in 
this figure. The grid of 53 in-sample stations provides good coverage for the major 
agricultural areas of Iowa. The geographic coordinates of each of the weather stations in 
Iowa can be obtained from NOAA-NCDC which is measured in degree of 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Locations of observing stations 
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latitude and longitude. Latitudes and longitudes for stations are transformed into X and Y 
coordinates in terms of Euclidian distance from a specific location in Nebraska as the grid 
origin. The distance between adjacent in-sample weather stations averages 36.8 kilometers, 
with a maximum (minimum) distance between weather stations 72.4 (24.1) kilometers.  
Figure 4.3 maps the means of reported ACDD levels for the counties in which the 
weather stations are located. The county ACDD means are the average of ACDD over 
stations in the county over years from 1980 to 2006. The figure shows that the south section 
of Iowa is the hottest. It gets cooler the more north one goes as expected. 
 
4.4 Methodology 
To address spatial basis risk, two sophisticated spatial approaches are employed. One is 
the less-developed MRF approach. The other is the well-developed geo-statistical approach. 
In addition, a naive multiple linear regression approach is also applied where 
 
 
                                          Figure 4.3. Reported county ACDD means (Fahrenheit) in Iowa 
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no spatial dependence of ACDD is assumed. This section presents the three models and 
prediction techniques to allow a comparison of the performance of MRF with the two 
common alternative approaches. 
 
4.4.1 Markov random field model 
A Markov random field (MRF) can be defined for any set of random variables defined 
on a lattice. The fact that the lattice is not necessarily regular makes MRF models suitable for 
this research where data is gathered at unequally spaced weather stations.  
Let ( ),i i iS u v≡ denotes the location of weather station i , where iu denotes the X 
coordinate and iv denotes the Y coordinate in terms of Euclidian distance from the grid origin 
which is located in northeast corner of Nebraska. The set of random variables considered is 
denoted as ( ){ }, : 1, , ; 1, ,iY y s t i S t T≡ = ⋅⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , where ( ),iy s t is the random variable defined 
at station i in year t . The total number of stations in a given year is denoted by S  and total 
number of years considered is denoted by .T A MRF model requires the specification of 
conditional distributions for each location conditional on all other locations as (4.2). 
( ) ( )( ), | , : , , 1, ,i i jf y s t y s t j i i j S≠ = ⋅⋅ ⋅                                     (4.2) 
A MRF model also requires that a neighborhood of observations be defined for each 
location. In this study, we use the estimated range of spatial correlation to define the 
neighborhood. The estimate of range is obtained as the minimum prediction mean squared 
error (PMSE) solution for all left-aside locations in year 1980 to 2005. We define 
neighborhood of station , ,ii N as the set of station j such that i js s− , the Euclidian distance 
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between station i  and station j , is less than or equal to the estimated range. Neighborhoods 
must be symmetric, that is, if ji N∈ , then ij N∈ . Since the lattice considered in this research 
is irregular, the number of neighborhood stations is different for different stations, varying 
from 6 to 23 for in-sample stations. The Markov part of the MRF model comes from the 
assumption that,  
              ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), | , : , | , : , , 1, ,i i j i i j if y s t y s t j i f y s t y s t j N i j S≠ = ∈ = ⋅⋅ ⋅               (4.3) 
(4.3) says that, given values at all other locations, the distribution of ( ),iy s t depends only on 
those values at locations within its neighborhood.  
The normality of standard seasonal and monthly indices on US temperatures was 
analyzed in Jewson (2004) with the conclusion that, for the summer CDD, the normal 
distribution gives a reasonable fit at almost all locations. This is equivalent to saying that the 
random variable of interest, ACDD, at any location follows a normal distribution. It is 
reasonable to assume ACDD for the entire set of locations follows a multivariate normal 
distribution for this research. If ACDD is multivariate normal, then the distribution of 
ACDD, conditional on neighborhood observations, and marginal distribution of ACDD will 
also be normal. Therefore, the conditional densities for each element of Y defined above is 
given as (4.4).  
      ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }1 22 2 21, | , : 2 exp , , ,2i i k i i i i k iif y s t y s t k N y s t A y s t k Nπτ τ
− ⎡ ⎤∈ = ⋅ − − ∈⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
          (4.4) 
where  
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }2
, , , | , ,
var , | , ,
i k i i k i
i i k i
A y s t k N E y s t y s t k N
y s t y s t k Nτ
⎡ ⎤∈ ≡ ∈⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤≡ ∈⎣ ⎦
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Based on the suggestion of Besag (1974) about the necessary structure form for conditional 
mean, we further model conditional mean as represented by (4.5). 
( )( ) ( ){ }, , ,i k i it ik k kt
k
A y s t k N c y s tα α∈ = + −∑                            (4.5) 
subject to the conditions that 2 2ik k ki ic cτ τ=  and 0iic = . Formulation (4.4) and (4.5) indicate 
that the marginal expectation of ( ),iy s t  is equal to itα , or, ( )( ),i itE y s t α= , and this provides 
one way to incorporate information on spatially or temporally varying covariates. Namely, 
covariates can be incorporated into the marginal mean structure. Suppose we have 
q covariates and we wish to include an intercept term in a linear model. This can be 
accomplished by taking  
( ) ( )( )11, , , , , Tit i q iX x s t x s t= ⋅⋅ ⋅  
and modeling 
T
it iXα β=  
or  
        Xα β=                                                            (4.6) 
Therefore, the joint probability distribution for ( ){ }, : 1, , ; 1, ,iY y s t i S t T≡ = ⋅⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  is given 
by 
    ( ) 1( , )Y Gau X I C Mβ −−∼                                         (4.7) 
In (4.7), ( ){ }, , 1, , ; 1, ,iX X s t i S t Tβ β= = ⋅⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , which is the marginal mean vector for in-
sample stations. I is the N by N identity matrix where N is equal to 1378, which is calculated 
as the number of in-sample stations (53) multiplied by the number of years (26) considered in 
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the model. Since covariates are included in the marginal mean structure, an assumption of 
constant conditional variance 2τ is made. M is thus an N by N diagonal matrix with diagonal 
entries identically equal to 2τ . C is an N by N matrix with entry of pair-wise dependence 
parameter. In this way, the symmetric constraint 2 2ik k ki ic cτ τ=  mentioned before is satisfied.   
For the conditional specified model described as above, the large-scale structure is 
shown by the marginal mean structure, while the small-scale structure is entirely captured in 
dependence matrix C. The matrix C contains 1378 different values which are too many for 
unrestricted estimation. In addition, meaningful models need to provide some structure for 
spatial dependence (e.g. isotropy, directional, etc). In this study, we assumed unidirectional 
dependence as a function of Euclidian distance. Namely, the spatial dependence does not 
depend on direction but on distance between the two locations involved. We focus on spatial 
dependence of ACDD and assume that there is no temporal dependence of ACDD across the 
historical time period investigated. Therefore, the C matrix is a diagonal block matrix with 53 
by 53 matrices on the diagonal. 
To model spatial dependence as a decreasing function of distance and as being constant 
throughout time, we employ the following pair-wise dependence structure 
    
1
0 . .
p
i
ij ij
j Nc d
o w
η
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ∈⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎨ ⎝ ⎠⎪⎩
                     (4.8)  
In (4.8), ij i jd s s= −  is the Euclidian distance between stations i and j ; p is the scale factor 
of inverse distance so that the scaled distance measure used is appropriate for statistical 
dependence.η is the constant spatial dependence parameter. 
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The approach we adopted for estimation is marginal likelihood maximization. 
Following the idea of Cressie (1993), combining structure (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6), we have the 
joint density of elements of Y as (4.9). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )/ 2 1/ 22 2 21( | , , ) 2 exp ' (4.9)2Nf Y C I C Y X I C Y Xβ τ πτ β βτ− ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= ⋅ − ⋅ − − − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  
The negative log likelihood is therefore given by  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2log 1, , log 2 ' (4.10)2 2 2I CNL C Y X I C Y Xβ τ πτ β βτ−⎛ ⎞= − + − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
In (4.10), I C−  is symmetric and positive definite. The negative log likelihood can be 
minimized applying a two-stage procedure. First, considering η to be fixed, minimization of 
the negative log likelihood leads to the following 
                                 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
2
ˆ ' '
ˆ ˆˆ ' /
X I C X X I C Y
Y X I C Y X N
β
τ β β
−= − −
= − − −
                              (4.11) 
(4.11) gives the maximum profile likelihood estimates of β and 2τ . Substituting these 
estimates back to the negative log likelihood function, the maximum likelihood estimator of 
η can be obtained by minimizing the negative log profile likelihood (4.12) with respect 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ } ( )1log( ) log 2 1 log ' ' ' 4.122 2 2I CN NL C Y I C I X X I C X X I C Yπ −−⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= + − + − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠  
to the unknownη . In the minimization process, the necessary checks on η  to ensure positive 
definite requirement is included. The maximum likelihood estimates of β and 2τ can be 
obtained by plugging estimatedη  back to (4.11). The power of inverse distance p is set to be 
equal to one in the spatial dependence structure. A profile analysis for p  is performed by 
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setting p as 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1, respectively. The results indicate that the profile likelihood 
was maximized at p =1. 
Models are derived and fit for ACDD data measured at in-sample stations in year 1980 
to 2005, a total of 26 years. ACDD records at left-aside locations are used to test the 
prediction power of the fitted model through cross-validation procedure. The statistic 
employed to test prediction power of different models is the prediction mean squared error. 
Let ( ),ly s t  denote the ACDD at the left-aside location ls  in year t. Assume that the 
distribution of ( ),ly s t  given ( ), , 1, ,53,ky s t k = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  is of the same form as (4.4), namely, we 
assume that ACDD at in-sample locations and left-aside locations are following the same 
distribution. Then the optimal predictor is given by (4.13). 
[ ] ( )( , ) | ( , ) : ( , ),l k l l k lE y s t y s t k N A y s t k N∈ = ∈                      (4.13) 
(4.13) is the conditional mean of ACDD at location ls conditional on ACDD of its 
neighborhood which is formed exclusively by a subset of in-sample locations. The 
expectation is immediately available from the conditional specified model. Using maximum 
likelihood estimates as plug-in values, we can obtain predicted values for left-aside location 
ls as (4.14).   
   [ ] ( )( )ˆ ˆ( , ) | ( , ) : ,
l
l k l l lk k k
k N
E y s t y s t k N X c y s t Xβ β
∈
∈ = + −∑              (4.14) 
Replicating this process, we can get predicted value of ACDD at all left-aside locations 
across 26 years. Finally, the PMSE can be calculated according to formulae (4.15). 
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( )
( ) ( )( )
2
2
1
ˆ
1 ˆ, ,
left aside left aside
M
l l
l
PMSE E Y Y
y s t y s t
M
− −
=
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∑
                                            (4.15) 
where ( ) { }ˆ , ( , ) | ( , ),l l k ly s t E y s t y s t k N= ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and M is the total number of left-aside locations 
in year 1980 to 2005. 
 
4.4.2 Multiple linear regression 
The naive method to model this ACDD data is to fit a multiple linear regression and 
predict for left-aside locations across years assuming there is no underlying spatial or 
temporal dependence at all. The AIC criterion is adopted to choose from candidate multiple 
linear models. The chosen model is represented as (4.16) 
 2 20 1 2 3 4 5_it t i i i i i i itACDD avg acdd x y x x y yβ β β β β β ε= ⋅ + + + + + ⋅ +                   (4.16) 
In (4.16), t indexes year, 1980, ,2005t = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ; i indexes in-sample weather stations, 1, ,53i = ⋅⋅ ⋅ ; 
itACDD  is the accumulated cooling degree days during the summer season of station i in year 
t ; _ tavg acdd is the average ACDD in year t  in Iowa; ix  and iy are the X coordinate and Y 
coordinates of station i , which are constant across years. Similarly, 2 ,i i ix x y  and 
2
iy are the 
second-order polynomial terms in X and Y coordinates of station i . Table 4.2 reports the 
coefficient estimates of multiple linear regression. The number in the parenthesis is the 
standard error of the corresponding estimate.  
All the parameter estimates are significant at the 0.1% significance level. The  
98.65% of 2R implies that 98.65% of the variability of ACDD across in-sample stations 
across years can be explained by the model. It is easy to understand that 2R is as 
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              Table 4.2. Regression coefficient estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0257 0.2011 0.4746 0.0005 -0.0024 -0.0014 0.9865 
(-0.0143) (-0.0641) (-0.0963) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0002) ---  
 
high as 0.9865 since we put the yearly average ACDD in the model as a covariate which is 
expected to have a very high correlation with ACDD at each weather station.  
The prediction based on this multiple linear regression approach is simple. For any left-
aside location, if the corresponding yearly average ACDD and its X and Y coordinates are 
known, the predicted ACDD at that location can be obtained simply by plugging them in the 
fitted linear model. The PMSE for all left-aside locations can be calculated by formulae 
(4.17). 
   
( )
( ) ( )( )
2
2
1
ˆ
1 ˆ, ,
left aside left aside
M
l l
l
PMSE E Y Y
y s t y s t
M
− −
=
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∑
                                            (4.17) 
where ( ) ˆˆ ,l ly s t X β=  and M is the total number of left-aside locations in year 1980 to 2005. 
 
4.4.3 Geo-statistical model       
Different from MRF approach, the standard geo-statistical approach does not assume 
any distribution for the data. Instead, a spatial variogram is employed to quantify spatial 
dependence. For locations is  and js  and associated random variables ( )iz s  and ( )jz s , the 
variogram is defined as (4.18). 
   1( ) var{ ( ) ( )} ,
2i j i j i j
s s z s z s all s s Dγ − ≡ − ∈                                 (4.18) 
0βˆ 1ˆβ 2βˆ 3βˆ 4βˆ 5βˆ 2R
 
101 
 
where D  is the entire set of weather stations. To calculate sample variogram, suppose that 
( ){ } ; ,E z s s Dμ= ∀ ∈  then we would have  
   21( ) [ ( ) ( )]
2i j i j
s s E z s z sγ − = −                                                        (4.19) 
(4.19) suggests using the average of squared differences in data values to represent ( )γ ⋅ . For a 
given displacement h, if we have observations from a set of pairs of 
locations },...,1,;:),{()( njihsssshN jiji ==−≡ , a sample variogram for this displacement 
would be 
   2
( )
1( ) { ( ) ( )}
2 ( )
d
i j
N h
h z s z s h R
N h
γ = − ∈∑                                   (4.20) 
In (4.20), )(hN  is the number of pairs in the set )(hN . Without repeated observations at the 
same displacement, we will not have sets )(hN . In fact, typically we will not have more than 
a few pairs of observations with the same displacement. To deal with this problem, we use 
the idea of tolerance region. Suppose, in a given set of data, there are m  distinct 
displacement values. Choose k of these values ,,...,1),( kllh =  and define tolerance regions 
as .,...,1)),(( kllhT =  Then the set of paired locations with distance within the corresponding 
tolerance region can be defined as   
.,...1))},((:),{())(( kllhTsssslhN jiji =∈−≡  
We will consider two of the most common variogram models in this analysis. Both 
models make the assumption that displacement between two locations )( ji ss − enters the 
variogram only in terms of distance ( )ij i jd s s= − . The first is the exponential variagram 
model 
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0 0
( | )
(1 exp( / )) 0
h
h
a b h c h
γ θ =⎧= ⎨ + − − ≠⎩                           (4.21) 
where ),,( cba=θ , with 0,0 ≥≥ ba and 0≥c . The second is the spherical variogram model 
   3
0 0
( | ) (1.5 ( / ) 0.5 ( / ) ) 0
h
h a b h c h c h c
a b h c
γ θ
=⎧⎪= + ⋅ − ⋅ < ≤⎨⎪ + ≥⎩
              (4.22) 
where ),,( cba=θ , with 0,0 ≥≥ ba and 0≥c . Both variogram models are characterized by 
the same set of parameters as follows. The range c  is the distance at which the variogram 
reaches a maximum (if it does). The interpretation of the range is that it is the distance 
beyond which ( )z s h+ and ( )z s are no longer correlated. The sill a b+  is the value of the 
variogarm when evaluated at any distance greater than or equal to the range. The sill is 
usually a constant number. The nugget a  presents micro-scale variance.  Clearly, 0)0( =γ  if 
h =0. But it may not be true that  0)/( →θγ h  as 0→h . If ah →)/( θγ  as 0→h , then a  
is called the nugget. The nugget is how much of the variation of the response variable cannot 
be explained spatially.  
The prediction method in geo-statistical approach is referred as kriging. Different types 
of kriging can be chosen according to the underlying assumption for the stochastic process. 
Ordinary kriging is chosen in this study which assumes that the underlying process is 
intrinsically stationary. A process is said to be intrinsically stationary if it is of constant mean 
and constant variogram at a certain distance. In practice, the assumption that variogram is a 
function of distance alone is difficult to verify---it remains an assumption (Cressie, 1993). 
Therefore, modeling and prediction are carried out based on residuals instead of the original 
ACDD data measured at in-sample locations which satisfy the constant mean assumption. 
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Given the fitted model from multiple linear regression approach, ACDD data for in-sample 
locations can be detrended by subtracting the fitted values from the original ACDD values to 
get ACDD residuals. The residuals satisfied the stationary assumption required for empirical 
variogram estimation. We assume unidirectional spatial dependence or isotropy as we did in 
MRF modeling, which means that displacement between two locations enters the variogram 
only in terms of distance, but not of direction. Empirical spatial variograms at different 
distances for each of the 26 years from 1980 to 2005 is estimated using a package called 
“geoR” associated with R software. The maximum distance we considered for the range is 
400 kilometers which turns out to be much greater than the estimated range. For each year, 
we can get a vector of spatial variograms with each element as the value of the spatial 
variogram associated with a certain distance defined as the midpoint value of the 
corresponding bins. 
Generally, variogram models are fitted to data recorded at the same year or same day. 
For multiple-year data as in this study, one could fit variogram models for each year. But, it 
is difficult to choose among the fitted models when they are quite different from year to year. 
We address this difficulty by stacking the 26 estimated variogram values across years for 
each of the bins and fit a variogram model to the stacked data. The obtained estimate of range 
is thus an expectation of spatial correlated range across years. However, different fitted 
models can be obtained by varying the size of the bins or the midpoint value of first bin. The 
estimate of spatial correlated range varies from about 90 to 150 kilometers depending on the 
model selected. This is the nature of variogram model fitting and thus the big drawback of 
geo-statistical approach when multiple years of data are involved. Therefore, instead of 
searching for the best model using standard geo-statistical approach, which is actually 
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impossible because of the multiple-year data explored in this study, we decide to find the 
fitted variogram model of which the estimated range is close enough to the one obtained 
from MRF model. A fitted spherical model is obtained as shown in Table 4.3. With the 
parameter estimates of nugget a , sill a b+  and range c , we can predict for left-aside 
locations across years using ordinary kriging. 
It is known that under squared error loss, the optimal predictor is the conditional mean 
which can be calculated accordingly provided with probability distribution (Casella and 
Berger, 2002). But, geo-statistical analysis does not assign any probability distribution. 
Instead, it provides the linear, unbiased predictor for left-aside location ls  in year t  as the 
linear combination of residuals at in-sample locations as (4.23). 
    ( ) ( )53
1
, ,l i i
i
z s t Z z s tλ λ
=
= ⋅ = ∑                                       (4.23) 
Unbiasedness requires that ( )( ),E z s t μ= , which is equivalent to require that 53
1
1i
i
λ
=
=∑ .                              
Thus, minimization of the PMSE becomes minimization of  
( ) ( )
253 53
1 1
, , 1l i i i
i i
E z s t z s t mλ λ
= =
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤− − ⋅ −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  
where m is a lagrange multiplier due to the constraint
53
1
1i
i
λ
=
=∑ . Solving this minimization  
 
                                           Table 4.3. Spherical model parameter estimates 
parameter Estimate Std. Error t value 
a  5614.84 500.28 11.22 
b  1908.6 509.29 3.75 
c  133.69 51.81 2.58 
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problem yields the following: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1 1 2 1 53 11
2 1 2 2 2 53 22
53 53 1 53 2 53 53 53
, , , , 1
, , , , 1
, , , ,1
1, 1, , 1, 0 1
l
l
l
s s s s s s s s
s s s s s s s s
s s s s s s s s
m
γ γ γ γλ
γ γ γ γλ
λ γ γ γ γ
−− − ⋅⋅⋅ − −⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ − − ⋅⋅⋅ − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − ⋅⋅⋅ − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝
i
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎠
 
or  
     1λ γ−= Γ                                                                  (4.24) 
In (4.24),λ is the vector containing linear coefficient estimates together with the lagrange 
multiplier estimate. The entry ( )i js sγ − in the Γmatrix are estimated variograms between 
in-sample location is and , , 1, ,53js i j = ⋅⋅ ⋅ . The entry ( )l is sγ − in the γ vector are estimated 
variograms between left-aside location ls and in- sample location is , 1, ,53i = ⋅⋅ ⋅ . All the 
estimated variograms are calculated according to the fitted spherical model with estimated 
nugget, sill and range as the plug-in values. 
A linear combination of the 53 in-sample residuals with coefficients calculated as 
above gives the predicted residual of the left-aside location ls  as (4.25). 
    ( ) ( )53
1
ˆˆ , ,l i i
i
z s t z s tλ
=
= ∑                                                (4.25) 
This ( )ˆ ,lz s t  is only the predicted value for the residual at the location ls in year t . To predict 
ACDD we need to add this predicted residual back to the estimated trend for that location in 
year t  which can be calculated according to the fitted multiple linear regression (4.16) by 
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plugging in the coefficients estimates together with the X, Y coordinates and corresponding 
yearly average ACDD. Similarly, prediction of ACDD at other left-aside locations across 
years can be derived. Provided with predicted ACDD at all left-aside location, the PMSE 
desired is simply 
     
( )
( ) ( )( )
2
2
1
ˆ
1 ˆ, ,
left aside left aside
M
l l
l
PMSE E Y Y
y s t y s t
M
− −
=
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∑
                                (4.26) 
In (4.26), ( ) ( )ˆˆ ˆ, ,l l ly s t X z s tβ= +  and M is the total number of left-aside locations in year 
1980 to 2005. 
 
4.5 Prediction results and model comparisons 
For problems where the primary objective is spatial prediction, the criterion for model 
assessment is cross-validation. We conducted a cross-validation comparison of the linear 
model, geo-statistical model and MRF model using ACDD data. The PMSE of the left-aside 
locations across years applying the three methods are given in Table 4.4. 
It is clear from Table 4.4 that the geo-statistical approach offers improvement over 
multiple linear regression approach in terms of prediction. The prediction error is reduced by 
9.5%. The improvement of MRF approach over geo-statistical approach is smaller but 
positive, suggesting that the MRF approach to spatial prediction may be promising. Multiple 
linear regression is not a good method to model ACDD if ACCD is spatially correlated 
 
                                     Table 4.4. PMSE of models of ACDD 
Model Linear  Geo-statistics  MRF 
PMSE 216643.6 196157.8 191211.7 
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because it does not take into consideration of the spatial dependence of ACDD, whereas the 
geo-statistical approach and MRF approach do.  
For ordinary kriging, the stationary assumption must be satisfied. Therefore, modeling 
and prediction are based directly on residuals which satisfy the constant mean assumption. 
The MRF approach requires parametric specification of the distribution for variables of 
interest and has no stationary assumption. Instead of working on residuals, the modeling and 
prediction are carried out by considering jointly the large-scale structure and small-scale 
structure which is residuals from the large-scale structure. One of the reasons that MRF 
approach out-performed the geo-statistical approach is that the large-scale structure is 
estimated taking into consideration the variability in the small-scale structure. Namely, the 
large-scale structure and the small-scale structure are estimated jointly. Different from 
ordinary kriging where prediction for a certain location relies on the entire data points, for the 
MRF approach, the prediction for certain                   location only depends on locations 
within its neighborhood.  If it is true that given values at locations in the neighborhood, there 
is no dependence on other locations, then MRF model will perform better because prediction 
is based on local information which is believed to be more relevant. On the contrary, the 
prediction of geo-statistical approach is based on all in-sample locations, some of which may 
not be relevant at all. The nature of geo-statistical model estimation when multiple years or 
days are involved makes it a drawback of that approach. While, for parameter estimation in 
the MRF approach, the likelihood of the multiple-year data are maximized assuming a 
normal distribution as shown by (4.7). The automated nature of estimation with MRF models 
make it easier to model multiple years of data. 
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4.6 Index insurance contract and its pricing 
A temperature insurance policy is proposed to protect farmers against the risk of corn 
yield reduction due to high temperature based on cooling degree days accumulated during the 
summer months of June, July and August. The reason that we choose a seasonal contract 
rather than a strip of monthly contracts is that monthly temperatures are typically auto-
correlated (Jewson and Brix, 2005). Using a strip of monthly contracts may lead to an over-
hedging problem. In addition, transaction costs associated with a strip of monthly contracts is 
higher than a single seasonal contract. A linear regression relates ACDD to time indicate 
there is no significant warming trend in any of the nine CRD in Iowa. Figure 4.4 shows the 
average ACDD versus time from 1980 to 2006 in Iowa. The results are consistent with 
Jewson and Brix’s findings of weak or no trend in summer temperature in the United State.  
 
 
Figure 4.4. Average ACDD over time from 1980 to 2006 in Iowa 
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Therefore, the ACDD guarantee is set as the 26-year average of ACDD for an insured 
location. The ACDD guarantee is obtained by taking the average of either the recorded 
ACDD over 26 years for locations where weather station data are available or the 
interpolated ACDD for locations where a weather station is not available. The liability value 
is determined by expected revenue which is the product of expected corn price, expected 
corn yield, insured acres and coverage level. The price can be set as the CBOT average 
December future price quoted in February. The expected yield can be set as the predicted 
trend yield. 
The indemnity function takes the form of an exotic call option on the value of actual 
ACDD. Under the proposed plan, insured customers will receive a claim payment if the 
actual ACDD index is higher than the ACDD strike value. Put in mathematical form: 
    F Tliability P Y A C= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , and 
     indemnity =max{ 0,  min[ ,A S
G
ACDD ACDDL F L
ACDD
⎛ ⎞−× ×⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
]}                   (4.27) 
In (4.27), FP : CBOT average December corn future price quoted in February 
               TY : trend yield 
               A : insured acreage 
               C : coverage level (C [ ]0,1∈ ) 
               L : liability 
               F : indemnity factor 
               AACDD : the actual ACDD recorded or interpolated (predicted) 
               SACDD : strike value of ACDD 
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               GACDD : the guaranteed ACDD  
Following the idea of Paulson (2006), the indemnity factor, ,F is estimated for each 
CRD in Iowa through a simple linear regression which relates corn yields to ACDD index. 
The left-hand side variable RY  is the ratio of the actual yield to the trend yield. The right-
hand side variable RACDD is the ratio of actual ACDD to the 26-year average in each CRD. 
In this way, the corresponding estimated coefficient can be interpreted as the percentage of 
yield shortfall below the trend yield due to one percent increase of ACDD above the long-
term average. The linear model is represented as (4.28).  
    0 1ˆ ˆR RY ACDDβ β ε= + ⋅ +                                                   (4.28) 
Table 4.5 reports the regression estimates for each of the nine CRD in Iowa. The number in 
parenthesis is the standard error of corresponding coefficient estimate. The results indicate 
that there is a fairly strong negative relationship between corn yield and ACDD with a one 
percent increase in the ACDD above the 26-year average resulting in between  
a 0.2 percent decrease in corn yields below the trend yield (in the North Central CRD) and a 
0.72 percent decrease in corn yields (in the Southeast). The 2R can be interpreted as the 
portion of total yield variability explained by this specific weather event defined as ACDD. 
The coefficient estimate 1ˆβ is taken as the indemnity factor for the corresponding 
 
Table 4.5. Regression estimates for each of the nine CRD in Iowa 
CRD NW NC NE WC C EC SW SC SE 
1ˆβ  
-0.26 
(0.06) 
-0.2 
(0.06) 
-0.23 
(0.09) 
-0.36 
(0.07) 
-0.29 
(0.08) 
-0.43 
(0.12) 
-0.50 
(0.09) 
-0.53 
(0.13) 
-0.72 
(0.15) 
2R  0.41 0.29 0.21 0.52 0.33 0.34 0.55 0.42 0.48 
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CRD. Thus, for every one percent increase in ACDD above the 26-year average, the policy 
will pay a different percentage of the liability value in different CRDs, varying from 0.2 
percent to 0.72 percent. 
To rate the proposed insurance policy, Monte Carlo simulation technique is employed. 
In order to apply Monte Carlo simulation, the distribution of the underlying temperature 
index needs to be determined. The study of normality of standard seasonal and monthly 
indices on US temperatures conducted by Jewson (2004) suggests that for CDD index based 
on the individual months, the normal distribution does not do particularly well overall, but 
for a multiple-month CDD index, the normal distribution gives a reasonable fit at almost all 
locations. Therefore, we assume a normal distribution for the underlying ACDD index.  
In the United States, climate autocorrelation last up to at least six months, principally 
due to the effects of El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) (Jewson, 2004). This means that 
historical indices for contracts of longer than around six months cannot really be considered 
independent. Since our contract is based on seasonal index, we assume independence of 
estimated histories of ACDD from year to year.  
Given the normality assumption, independence assumption, and the fact of no warming 
trend, sample means and variances are taken as the estimates of the means and variances of 
the normal distribution for ACDD variable defined at county center points. Given the sample 
mean and variance for each county, 5000 ACDD random normal deviates are obtained for 
each reference point. The insurance policy is rated in terms of premium rate, namely, 
premium charged per dollar value of liability. According to the indemnity structure of the 
insurance contract, 5000 loss costs are calculated and the unconditional average of these 
5000 loss costs gives the break-even premium rate for the policies written on the county 
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reference points. Table 4.6 reports the premium rates at different strike levels which are 
chosen as 100%, 115%, 130% and 145% of the guaranteed ACDD level with the highest 
strike level matching the average historical extremes in ACDD.  
Iowa premium rates average 3.56 percent at 100% strike level, and 1.40 percent, 0.43 
percent and 0.11 percent at 115%, 130% and 145% strike levels, respectively. The premium 
rates are not restrictive, especially at high strike levels. For 100% strike level, the premium 
rates average 3.56 percent with a standard deviation of 1.43 percent. The maximum premium 
rate is 10.60 percent at the Keokuk County reference point in Southeast Iowa and the 
minimum value is 1.93 percent at the Wright County reference point in North Central Iowa. 
Figure 4.5 maps the premium rate levels at a 100% strike level. In general, premium rate 
levels are the lowest in the North Central and Northeast section of the state and are the 
highest in the Southeast section of the state.  
 
 
Figure 4.5. Map of Iowa premium rates at 100% strike level 
 
 
 
113 
 
             Table 4.6. Iowa county premium rates at various strike levels (%) 
County CRD 100% 115% 130% 145% County CRD 100% 115% 130% 145% 
Buena Vista  NW 2.48 1.02 0.33 0.08 Hardin C 2.70 1.07 0.33 0.07 
Cherokee NW 2.42 0.93 0.27 0.06 Jasper C 2.70 1.07 0.32 0.07 
Clay NW 2.55 1.07 0.35 0.09 Marshall  C 2.60 1.00 0.29 0.07 
Dickinson  NW 2.71 1.21 0.44 0.12 Polk C 2.53 0.94 0.26 0.05 
Emmet NW 2.85 1.31 0.49 0.15 Poweshiek C 2.70 1.03 0.31 0.07 
Lyon  NW 2.61 1.10 0.37 0.09 Story C 2.64 1.00 0.29 0.06 
O'Brien NW 2.58 1.08 0.35 0.09 Tama C 2.84 1.19 0.39 0.10 
Osceola NW 2.63 1.14 0.39 0.10 Webster C 2.56 1.00 0.29 0.06 
Palo Alto  NW 2.61 1.12 0.39 0.11 Benton  EC 4.05 1.62 0.51 0.11 
Plymouth  NW 2.38 0.93 0.27 0.06 Cedar EC 4.40 1.95 0.69 0.20 
Pocahontas NW 2.49 1.02 0.33 0.08 Clinton  EC 3.92 1.45 0.39 0.09 
Sioux NW 2.41 0.94 0.28 0.06 Iowa  EC 3.78 1.42 0.40 0.07 
Butler  NC 2.03 0.86 0.29 0.08 Jackson  EC 4.03 1.64 0.49 0.11 
Cerro Gordo  NC 2.06 0.91 0.34 0.09 Johnson EC 3.95 1.52 0.43 0.09 
Floyd NC 2.09 0.94 0.35 0.09 Jones EC 4.12 1.67 0.53 0.13 
Franklin  NC 1.93 0.78 0.26 0.07 Linn EC 4.09 1.63 0.48 0.10 
Hancock NC 2.15 0.97 0.36 0.11 Muscatine  EC 3.61 1.27 0.31 0.05 
Humboldt NC 2.02 0.85 0.28 0.07 Scott EC 3.74 1.30 0.32 0.05 
Kossuth NC 2.12 0.96 0.35 0.10 Adair SW 4.30 1.56 0.40 0.07 
Mitchell NC 2.27 1.07 0.43 0.15 Adams  SW 4.28 1.54 0.43 0.08 
Winnebago NC 2.44 1.20 0.51 0.18 Cass SW 4.29 1.53 0.38 0.06 
Worth NC 2.27 1.09 0.43 0.13 Fremont  SW 4.19 1.45 0.35 0.05 
Wright NC 1.93 0.80 0.27 0.07 Mills SW 4.13 1.44 0.37 0.06 
Allamakee NE 2.88 1.46 0.63 0.23 Montgomery  SW 4.23 1.46 0.35 0.06 
Black Hawk NE 2.23 0.92 0.30 0.07 Page SW 4.17 1.48 0.38 0.07 
Bremer NE 2.41 1.04 0.36 0.10 Pottawattamie SW 4.26 1.46 0.32 0.04 
Buchanan NE 2.27 0.96 0.32 0.08 Taylor  SC 4.40 1.58 0.40 0.06 
Chickasaw NE 2.51 1.15 0.43 0.13 Appanoose SC 4.38 1.51 0.36 0.05 
Clayton NE 2.35 1.02 0.36 0.10 Clarke SC 4.56 1.64 0.44 0.08 
Delaware  NE 2.24 0.93 0.31 0.08 Decatur  SC 4.90 1.92 0.56 0.12 
Dubuque  NE 2.24 0.92 0.30 0.08 Lucas SC 5.37 2.27 0.77 0.20 
Fayette NE 3.24 1.80 0.88 0.38 Madison  SC 4.50 1.60 0.42 0.07 
Howard NE 2.59 1.27 0.53 0.18 Marion  SC 4.62 1.70 0.47 0.09 
Winneshiek NE 2.34 1.01 0.35 0.10 Monroe  SC 4.58 1.65 0.41 0.08 
Audubon WC 2.98 1.02 0.25 0.05 Ringgold SC 4.69 1.73 0.48 0.09 
Calhoun WC 3.25 1.23 0.34 0.06 Union  SC 4.65 1.71 0.43 0.06 
Carroll WC 2.94 1.00 0.23 0.02 Warren  SC 4.66 1.70 0.44 0.08 
Crawford WC 3.06 1.11 0.29 0.05 Wayne  SC 4.58 1.62 0.41 0.07 
Greene WC 3.04 1.05 0.25 0.04 Davis  SE 6.33 2.42 0.68 0.13 
Guthrie WC 3.00 1.06 0.26 0.04 Des Moines  SE 5.69 1.86 0.41 0.06 
Harrison  WC 2.95 0.99 0.22 0.03 Henry SE 6.30 2.33 0.61 0.10 
Ida WC 3.11 1.13 0.30 0.06 Jefferson  SE 6.71 2.72 0.82 0.16 
Monona WC 2.97 0.98 0.21 0.03 Keokuk SE 10.6 5.96 2.95 1.30 
Sac WC 3.24 1.20 0.32 0.06 Lee SE 5.35 1.63 0.32 0.03 
Shelby  WC 4.88 2.61 1.24 0.51 Louisa SE 5.66 1.92 0.46 0.07 
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            Table 4.6. (continued) 
County CRD 100% 115% 130% 145% County CRD 100% 115% 130% 145% 
Woodbury WC 3.13 1.11 0.3 0.06 Mahaska SE 6.26 2.27 0.59 0.12 
Boone C 2.57 0.95 0.26 0.05 Van Buren SE 5.93 2.08 0.51 0.09 
Dallas  C 2.49 0.89 0.23 0.05 Wapello SE 6.33 2.25 0.56 0.1 
Grundy C 3.07 1.39 0.5 0.14 Washington  SE 6.37 2.43 0.68 0.15 
Hamilton  C 2.62 1 0.27 0.05             
 
 
4.7 Loss adjustment and historical analysis 
  The proposed insurance contract can be marketed in March of a year and loss 
adjustment can be carried out in November of that year when the actual temperature index 
value is available for locations which have weather stations. Taking 2006 as an example, 
Markov random field interpolation technique is applied to interpolate ACDD 
for the 99 county reference points. Then the percent loss for each reference point is 
calculated based on the interpolated ACDD history at the reference point. Unlike traditional 
crop insurance where farmers need to prove that damage occurred on his/her farms or county 
need to prove damage in the case of area-based insurance products, no proof is needed on the 
insured side under the proposed index insurance design. In addition, insurance companies do 
not need to adjust purchaser-specific crop loss, which is expensive and contains an element 
of subjectivity that growers seldom appreciate (Richards et al., 2004).  Figure 4.6 maps the 
calculated percent loss at 100% strike level for each county reference point based on the 
interpolated ACDD in 2006. The results indicate that most county reference points have 
accumulated cooling degree days above the corresponding 26-year guarantee. Thus, 
indemnities are triggered for those reference points. The calculated percent losses vary from 
0 to 13.78 with an average 3.35. 
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Figure 4.6. Map of Iowa 2006 percent losses at 100% strike level 
 
The loss adjustment procedure is replicated for all contract years from 1980 to 2005. 
Figure 4.7 to Figure 4.11 maps the calculated percent loss at 100% strike level for each 
county reference point based on interpolated ACDD in year 1988, 1983, 1981, 2004 and 
1993, respectively. The reasons that we are particularly interested in these five years are as 
follows. 1983 and 1988 are two of the lowest yielding and hot years when cornyields were 
about 25% and 35% below the historical trend yield average across the state of Iowa. Thus 
the insurance policy should pay off during these years. 1981 and 2004 are characterized as 
two extremely mild years when the corn yields are about 20% and 13% above the historical 
trend yield average across the state of Iowa. 1993 was chosen because corn yields in that year 
are the lowest in the time period investigated (40% below historical trend yield) due to the 
extreme wet weather instead of temperature factor in that year.   
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show that indemnity payments are triggered in all counties in 1988 
and 1983 with lower percent loss values occurring in north sections of the state and higher 
percent loss values occurred in south section, especially southeast section of the state. As  
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Figure 4.7. Map of Iowa percent losses at 100% strike level in 1988 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Map of Iowa percent losses at 100% strike level in 1983 
 
expected, the percent loss values are higher in 1988 which vary from 7.96 to 83.85 than those 
in 1983 which vary from 6.41 to 74.18. The figures also show that higher percent loss values 
occurred in a larger area in 1988 than in 1983. 
Figure 4.9 maps the percent loss at 100% strike level in 1981. Indemnity payments are 
triggered in only a handful of counties. As expected, the percent loss values are zero or small 
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positive numbers in almost all counties since the year 1981 is a mild year. For counties where 
losses occur, the percent loss values range from 0.97 percent in Webster County to 11.35 
percent in Keokuk County. Figure 4.10 maps the percent loss at 100% strike level in 2004 
which is characterized as an extremely mild year. The figure clearly shows that the  
 
 
Figure 4.9. Map of Iowa percent losses at 100% strike level in 1981 
 
 
              Figure 4.10. Map of Iowa percent losses at 100% strike level in 2004 
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interpolated ACDD is lower than the 26-year average in all counties and thus no indemnity 
payment is triggered.  
Figure 4.11 maps that percent loss at 100% strike level in 1993 which is characterized 
by the lowest corn yield in the historical time period investigated in this study. Although the 
corn yields are extremely low, the figure indicates that no indemnity is triggered in most of 
the counties. The reason is that the low yields are caused by the extremely wet weather of 
that year instead of heat stress which is the very risk exposure the proposed insurance policy 
insuring against. The performance of the insurance policy 
in this year thus shows it’s the limitation with regard to insuring against production risk. It 
does not provide protection against corn yield reduction due to other reasons than high 
temperature. 
Figure 4.12 shows the loss ratios at the 100% strike level for the 99 counties in Iowa 
from year 1980 to 2006 except for 1993. The loss ratio is calculated as the ratio of 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Map of Iowa percent losses at 100% strike level in 1993 
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         Figure 4.12. Average county loss ratio at 100% strike level in Iowa 
 
indemnity rate to the premium rate, which should average one over time if the policy is 
actuarially fair. Provided with the interpolated ACDD histories, the indemnity rate or the 
indemnity per dollar of liability was calculated for each county reference point according to 
the indemnity structure. The results indicate that the policy is actuarially fair because the 
historical loss ratio averages 0.95 across counties over the time period investigated which is 
very close to one.  A loss ratio of one is expected for a hypothetical time period which is long 
enough. 
Figure 4.13 shows the scatter plot of the average CRD percent loss cost against average 
CRD percent yield loss from 1980 to 2006. The percent loss cost for each county is 
calculated according to the indemnity structure. The average CRD percent loss cost is the 
average of percent loss cost over a CRD. The average CRD percent yield loss is the  
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                           Figure 4.13. Average CRD percent loss cost vs. percent yield loss from 1980 to 2006 
 
percentage of yield deviation from its trend yield, which is set at zero when there is no yield 
loss at all. Average is taken within a CRD. The straight line is the 45 degree line. 
Ideally, there would be is a one-to-one relationship between percent yield loss andpercent 
loss cost. The figure indicates that for most CRD in most of the years, the proposed insurance 
policy is reasonably effective in terms of protecting corn yield losses. There are situations 
where payments were not triggered when yield losses occurred or payments were triggered 
even there was no yield loss. The reason is that the proposed insurance policy only insure 
against yield losses due to high temperature. There are other factors such as precipitation and 
pests affecting corn yield also. The impacts of factors other than temperature are likely large 
when the temperature is extremely high, which corresponds to larger deviation from the 45 
degree line for cases of high percent yield losses shown in the figure. The nine points in the 
right-lower corner of Figure 4.13 correspond to the average CRD percent loss costs versus 
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percent yield losses in 1993 when it was an extremely wet year. It is clear that the percent 
yield losses are very high in every CRD while the percent loss costs are extremely low. 
Seven out of nine CRDs would not get any payment. Therefore, the proposed insurance 
contract would not be able to provide protection against risk of extreme moisture. 
 
4.8 Discussion and conclusions 
Weather index contracts have gained increased interest as new risk-management 
instruments in agricultural production. Although they solve a tremendous part of the 
problems the traditional crop insurance is plagued with, they also give rise to a new problem 
of basis risks. Much research has been done addressing the second layer or the technological 
basis risk. The first layer or spatial basis risk is often cited, yet rarely investigated. In this 
study, we apply sophisticated interpolation techniques to address the spatial basis risk of 
using temperature index to hedge against corn yield reduction in Iowa. Both the standard 
well-developed geo-statistical model and the less-developed Markov random field model are 
fitted to cooling degree data in Iowa. The comparisons of the prediction results indicate that 
MRF approach may be more promising in the sense of smaller cross-validation prediction 
mean squared error. To protect against yield reduction at farm-level, we propose a 
temperature index insurance policy which is essentially an exotic call option on ACDD and 
promises an indemnity payment to farmers when the underlying index ACDD is above the 
agreed strike value. Monte Carlo simulation technique is employed to calculate fair premium 
rate for the 99 county reference points in state of Iowa at various strike levels based on 
interpolated histories. The premium rates are not prohibitive, especially at high strike levels. 
Historical analysis shows that the proposed insurance policy successfully triggers indemnities 
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for places where the underlying temperature index ACDD is above the 26-year average. For 
extremely mild year such as 2004, no indemnity is triggered in any of the 99 county 
reference points. An analysis of the potential performance in year 1993 shows the limitation 
of the proposed index insurance policy. It will not provide protection against yield reduction 
due to reasons other than high temperature in the summer season. The historical analysis also 
shows that there is a systemic risk problem. When an indemnity payment is triggered at a 
location, chances are that indemnity payments are triggered in a large area around that 
location even the whole area of the state in hot years. Addressing spatial basis risk with a 
goal to provide insurance against yield reduction to farmers can not solve the supply-side 
problem of systemic risks. Given the high-level systemic nature of temperature, the proposed 
insurance policy is better supplied by large insurance companies or government agencies 
which can securitize the systemic risks via the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and over-the-
counter security markets. 
Data of various weather variables can be obtained from NOAA-NCDC. The MRF 
interpolation technique can be applied directly to interpolate weather indices for any location 
needed. Index insurance constructed based on interpolated index values should be more 
efficient in terms of protecting risk of insured and it is more important for situations where 
the underlying indices have a lower level degree of spatial correlation such as precipitation 
and hail. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation presents research findings on three topics related to crop risk and 
insurance in the United States. The first topic estimates the willingness to pay for farm 
programs and crop insurance using prospect theory. The second topic develops a new method 
to measure the degree of risk poolability of an insurance book of business. The third topic 
shows how spatial basis risk from weather index insurance contracts can be reduced using 
Markiv random field models.  
Chapter 2 examines the willingness to pay for 2002 farm bill programs and yield crop 
insurance and the programs’ impacts on acreage decision of a representative Iowa farmer 
who receives both farm program benefits and crop insurance benefits. The mathematical 
problem of the representative farmer is to maximize expected profit and expected utility by 
allocating land to crops. The crops considered in this study are corn, soybeans and alfalfa 
hay. The results indicate that for farmers with reasonable risk aversion level, alfalfa hay will 
not enter into solution of acreage decision problems. This is not surprising because both corn 
and soybeans have higher expected crop profit than does hay. Furthermore, hay does not 
receive subsidies like corn and soybeans.  
Instead of measuring producer welfare using expected utility to capture farmers’ 
preferences over risky alternatives, we apply recent advances in decision theory and use 
prospect theory to measure welfare changes due to government programs. The combination 
of the value function of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the weighting function of Prelec 
(1998) provide the cumulative prospect theory framework which is shown to offer a globally 
more consistent utility functional form which can characterize farmers’ preferences over risk. 
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Loss aversion and the weighting scheme are the reasons that cumulative prospect theory can 
better characterize a farmer’s preference over risk alternatives than does expected utility 
theory. The implementation of cumulative prospect theory is demonstrated for a hypothetical 
mixed prospect with 5000 outcomes.  
Welfare and decision analysis based on the calibration results of cumulative prospect 
theory are carried out for both harsh and no yield penalty for continuous cropping. The 
results lead to the following conclusions. First, there is no policy distortion to farmers’ 
acreage decisions at either harsh or no yield penalties for planting corn after corn or soybeans 
after soybeans. Therefore, government programs act as lump-sum transfers to farmers with 
regard to their acreage decisions. Second, for the four existing government programs, 
farmers’ willingness to pay per dollar of program cost is greatest for crop insurance. Given 
that farmers have crop insurance, the willingness to pay per dollar cost is much lower for 
loan deficiency payments, direct payments, and counter-cyclical payments. Last, efficiency 
measures of individual government programs are low because of three reasons. First, the sum 
of decision weights for the mixed prospect is 0.74, which implies that when we calculate the 
expected value of the mixed prospect, we eliminate 26% of the expected value at the very 
beginning. Farmer’s willingness to pay thus the efficiency measure is lower accordingly. 
Second, the payment from each of the government programs only moves the farmer from a 
state of loss to another state of loss where loss aversion coefficient shrinks the WTP for 
programs by a factor of 1/2.25. The efficiency measure is lowered accordingly. And third, 
payments from these government programs are made not only when there is a loss but also 
when there is a gain. Expected value is essentially the weighted average of all values. Loss 
aversion leads to more value associated with a dollar increase in the loss part than that in the 
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gains part. In addition, the calibrated weighting scheme where β + is greater than β − results 
in a higher decision weight for a loss than for a gain of the same order. Therefore, the change 
in expected value is lower when many of payments are made in the gains part relative to the 
change in expected value when all the payments are made in the loss part. An investigation 
showed that the proportion of payments made in the gains part for DPs, CCPs and LDPs are 
43.2%, 23.5% and 24.7%, respectively. For CI, only 9.7% of the payments are made in the 
gains part, which account for the highest efficiency of CI among those government programs.  
The endowment effect can be seen from the comparison of results of WTP scenario and 
WTA scenario since the high reference income point of WTA scenario is due to the 
endowment of all farm programs. The comparisons show that farmers value government 
programs more when he has a higher endowment. In another word, it leads to more pain to 
farmers to be deprived of those government programs when farmers originally have access to 
them than joy to farmers by providing farm programs when they are originally not available 
to farmers. 
The construction of the cumulative prospect representations investigated in this study 
incorporates loss aversion and the value function is defined on deviations in wealth from a 
reference income level. The implementation and calibration show that the cumulative 
prospect representations investigated are able to reconcile significant small-scale risk 
aversion with reasonable degrees of large-scale risk aversion. Within the expected utility 
framework, turning down a modest-stake gamble means that the marginal utility of money 
must diminish very quickly for small changes in wealth. While prospect theory’s value 
function has loss aversion, which means that turning down a modest-stake gamble does not 
necessarily imply that marginal utility of money diminishing quickly for small changes in 
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wealth. An empirical investigation shows that in addition to loss aversion, the choice of risk 
attitude level in cumulative prospect theory framework is also important. When the risk 
attitude is too low, people turn down small stakes also turn down large stakes because the 
convexity of the weighting function can not overcome the concavity of the utility function.  
In Chapter 3, the focus shifts to the private insurance industry. The goal of this study is 
to develop a method to measure the risk poolability of any specific book of business quickly 
by simply knowing a few key statistics of the given book of business. 
The method is developed using hail-insurance data. Exploratory analysis indicates that 
Western Iowa experiences greater hail losses than Easter Iowa. Spatial statistics are 
employed to measure the maximum distance that hail losses independent. The results suggest 
that on average the range is 41 kilometers which means that on average hail losses are no 
longer correlated when two locations are more than 41 kilometers apart in Iowa. Based on 
this estimate of range, a measure called proportion index is created which measures the 
weighted proportion of pair distances exceeding the estimated spatial range. In addition, the 
well-known Herfindahl index is employed to measure the acreage concentration across 
customers of a book of business. To measure the portfolio risk, the coefficient of variation of 
total indemnities paid is employed which is equal to the standard deviation of the total 
indemnities divided by the mean of the total indemnities. A wide range of books of business 
is simulated applying Monte Carlo simulation technique. The simulated books of business 
vary by number of customers, location concentration and acreage concentration which are the 
key factors of a book of business affecting its risk poolability. Diversification measures and 
portfolio risk of each simulated book of business are calculated which provide the 
explanatory and explained variables of interest. After investigation, a Cobb-Douglas model is 
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obtained which captures the simulation procedure quite well. About 98% of variability of the 
risk poolability can be explained by the proportion index and Herfindahl index of the book of 
business.  
Although it is derived based on hail loss cost data from the state of Iowa, the model is 
directly applicable to a larger geographic area, assuming similar pattern of spatial correlation, 
in the sense that both proportion index and Herfindahl index are unitless. For crop insurance 
or other lines of insurance in which risk is spatially related, we can still apply this method to 
derive a new model to predict risk poolability of a given book of business. Of course, 
investigation of the spatial correlation of the corresponding risk is needed in constructing the 
new models. 
Chapter 4 turns to weather-based index contracts as alternative risk management 
instruments for crop losses. The goal of this study is to reduce the basis risk which is a major 
concern associated with developing weather-based index contracts. An application of the 
methodology is provided through an example of a temperature insurance contract designed to 
protect against farm-level corn yield reduction in Iowa. To address spatial basis risk, both the 
standard well-developed geo-statistical model and the less-developed Markov random field 
(MRF) model are fitted to the cooling degree data. The comparisons of the prediction results 
indicate that MRF approach may be more promising in the sense of smaller cross-validation 
prediction mean squared error. The technological basis risk is addressed through the use of 
indemnity factor which can be obtained through linear regression relating corn yield losses to 
the temperature index rises. The premium rates were calculated based on interpolated 
histories using Monte Carlo techniques. Historical analysis shows that the premium rates are 
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actuarially fair and the proposed insurance policy is effective in terms of protect corn yield 
losses due to high temperature.  
Weather-caused yield losses are generally correlated across space due to the systemic 
nature of weather. Therefore, weather-based index contracts are better supplied by large 
insurance companies or government agencies which can aggregate crop losses to reduce the 
idiosyncratic risk in the aggregate portfolio and securitize the systemic risks via the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange and over-the-counter security markets. 
Data of various weather variables can be obtained from NOAA-NCDC. The MRF 
interpolation technique can be applied directly to interpolate weather indices for any location 
needed. Index insurance constructed based on interpolated index values should be more 
efficient in terms of protecting risk of insured and it is more important for situations where 
the underlying indices have a lower level degree of spatial correlation such as precipitation 
and hail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
